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I.  THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
A. Policy and Economics of the Antitrust Laws 
The economic rationale behind a free market economy is that freely 
operating competitive markets will result in the most efficient allocation 
of a nation's scarce resources and will bring consumers the widest variety 
of choices and the lowest possible prices.1  Antitrust laws are intended to 
ensure that markets remain competitive.  
 For much of their history, the antitrust laws were given a vaguely 
populist hue, with both social as well as economic justifications.2  
However, over the past twenty years, the promotion of consumer welfare 
has become the sole guiding principle of the antitrust laws.3  Consumer 
welfare has in turn been equated with economic efficiency.   
 The antitrust laws protect competitive markets (thereby 
promoting economic efficiency) by proscribing certain types of conduct.  
Agreements among competitors that interfere with the ability of firms to 
enter markets, introduce new products or price their products as they see 
fit are generally viewed as "anticompetitive" and the proper concern of 
antitrust policy.4  The other prime antitrust concern is monopolization.  
Monopolies are viewed as destructive to competition, at least when 
accomplished or maintained by means unrelated to merit.5  Monopolists 
impose a "deadweight loss" on society by reducing their output below the 
level which consumers would be willing to purchase at a competitive 
price.6  Also, monopolies reduce consumer choice.  
 While there is widespread consensus regarding the harm to 
consumers from cartels and monopolies, there is disagreement among 
                                                 
1    Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy:  The Law of Competition and its Practice, West 
Pub. Co. p.3 (1994). 
2     See generally, Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy:  The Law of Competition and its 
Practice, West Pub. Co. p. 59-61 (1994) 
3  See Chairman Timothy Muris, Remarks at the American Bar Association, Antitrust Section 
Annual Meeting, Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word—
Continuity (ABA, Aug. 7, 2001) (press release at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/08/murisaba.htm> (accessed Mar. 7 2003)).  
4      See generally, ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 1, 3-16 (Debra J. 
Pearlstein ed., 5th ed., ABA 2002). 
5      Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, __ (Basic Books, Inc. 1978). 
6     Herbert Hovenkamp, Fedeal Antitrust Policy:  The Law of Compeition and its Practice, West 
Pub. Co. p. 20 (1994) 
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both academics and the judicial community about how to respond when 
the threat to consumer welfare is more tenuous or less likely to 
materialize, as would be the case with some mergers or predatory pricing 
strategies, for example. 
B. The Laws 
The three main statutory provisions defining conduct that is unlawful 
under the antitrust laws are Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act7 and Section 7 of the Clayton Act.8   
 
There are a number of other statutory antitrust provisions that 
occasionally come into play in the intellectual property context, for 
example Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act9 (prohibiting 
unfair methods of competition) and Section 3 of the Clayton Act10 
(prohibiting certain forms of tying and exclusive dealing). 
C. Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws—Standards 
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
                                                 
7   15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:  “Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 
 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:   
 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of 
the court. 
8  Id. § 18.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes stock and asset acquisitions that, “where in 
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly.” 
9  Id. § 45. 
10  Id. § 14. 
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Section 1 reaches exclusively collective conduct (i.e., contract, 
combination, or conspiracy).  It reaches both horizontal bilateral conduct 
(among competitors) and vertical bilateral conduct (among entities at 
different levels of the distribution chain, e.g., manufacturers and 
distributors, sellers and buyers, and licensors of technology and users of 
technology).  
The term “restraint of trade” is extremely broad and if read literally could 
encompass many types of productive commercial activities.11  However, 
as the law has developed, conduct is reviewed under Section 1 more 
flexibly, using either a “per se” or “rule of reason” standard.12 
A per se approach is reserved for business methods that are so pernicious 
and plainly anti-competitive that they can be deemed unlawful “without 
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm that they have caused or the 
business excuse for their use.”13  Examples of conduct that is per se 
illegal under the antitrust laws are price fixing, bid rigging, and 
horizontal market allocations.  In a suit brought against conduct that is 
per se unlawful, the sole competitive issue is whether the defendant 
committed the conduct.14  If the conduct occurred, there is a violation of 
Section 1.15  The defendant may not present evidence to show that, in 
fact, the conduct at issue had no anticompetitive effects or indeed had 
procompetitive benefits.16  
Conduct not per se illegal is evaluated under the “rule of reason.”17  In 
rule of reason cases, the finder of fact must decide whether the 
questioned conduct is an unreasonable restraint on competition by 
balancing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the conduct.18  
This analysis involves a number of factors, including “specific 
information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the 
                                                 
11    For example, common business partnerships could be considered to restrain trade, although 
they have not been deemed illegal “restraints of trade” under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
See, Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 406 (1904) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
12      ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 1, 47-48 (Debra J. Pearlstein ed., 
5th ed., ABA 2002). 
13     Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
14     Id. 
15     See generally, ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 1, 46-47 (Debra J. 
Pearlstein ed., 5th ed., ABA 2002). . 
16     Id.at 47. 
17     Id. at 58. 
18  See e.g. Natl. Soc’y. of Prof. Engr. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
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restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”19  
The rule of reason is most commonly applied in Section 1 cases.20 
The Supreme Court has also approved the use of a truncated rule of 
reason analysis (sometimes called a “quick look” analysis) in situations 
that seem obviously anticompetitive but could still have a procompetitive 
justification.21  In quick look cases, the courts do not require the plaintiff 
to conduct a complete market analysis before shifting the burden on to 
the defendant to prove that the restraint has a procompetitive effect.22  In 
California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission,23 the 
Supreme Court rejected the use of quick look analysis for challenged 
advertising restrictions, but suggested that a longer look, although short 
of full rule of reason analysis, would suffice.24   
2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
Section 2 reaches both collective conduct (combination or conspiracy) 
and unilateral conduct (monopolization and attempts to monopolize).   
    “The offense of monopoly under [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act 
has two elements:  (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”25  It forbids the 
use of monopoly power “to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive 
advantage, or to destroy a competitor.”26   
                                                 
19  St. Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
20  See ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 1, 58 (Debra J. Pearlstein ed., 
5th ed., ABA 2002). 
21  See Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); 
Fed. Trade Commn. v. Ind. Fedn. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
22  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109-10 (“As a matter of law, the absence of market power does 
not justify a naked restriction on price or output.”). 
23   526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
24  Id. at 779.  The Court suggested a flexible inquiry approach, “looking to the circumstances, 
details, and logic of a restraint.” Id. at 781. 
25  U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).   
26  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992) (quoting 
U.S. v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)). 
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Monopoly power is “the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.”27  It may be “inferred from a firm's possession of a 
dominant share of a relevant market that is protected by entry barriers.”28 
To determine whether monopoly power exists in a “relevant market,” it is 
necessary to define the relevant product and geographic market.  The 
relevant product market includes substitute products to which a customer 
may turn in response to a rise in price of the main product.29  Thus, 
commodities that are “reasonably interchangeable” make up part of the 
same relevant market.30  The geographic market is the geographic area to 
which customers may look for such competing products.  “Defining the 
relevant market is an indispensable element of any monopolization or 
attempt case.”31   
Attempted monopolization requires:  (a) the intent to monopolize a 
relevant market, (b) predatory conduct in pursuit of that end, (c) a 
dangerous probability of success, and (d) causal “antitrust” injury.32   
3. Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
Section 7 generally governs stock and asset acquisitions.  Exclusive 
licenses are also evaluated under Section 7.  To assess whether an 
acquisition violates Section 7, the relevant product and geographic 
markets must be defined and the effect of the acquisition on competition 
in that market must be assessed.  The Merger Guidelines explain the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade 
Commission’s (FTC) current standards for evaluating the lawfulness of 
acquisitions under Section 7.33 
D. Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws 
                                                 
27  U.S. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).  
28  U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
29  Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571. 
30  E.I. Du Pont, 351 U.S. at 395.   
31  Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  For defining relevant 
markets, see generally U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines section one (April 2, 1992) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines] 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/toc.html> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
32  Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983). 
33  See Merger Guidelines, supra. 
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The FTC and DOJ are responsible for enforcing the antitrust laws.  The 
DOJ enforces Sherman Act and Clayton Act cases through actions in the 
courts, while the FTC enforces FTC Act and Clayton Act violations, 
generally through administrative litigation.34 
 
The Sherman Act is both a civil and criminal statute.  The DOJ regularly 
enforces the Sherman Act criminally against “hard core” anticompetitive 
behavior such as bid rigging and price fixing.35  In criminal cases, the 
DOJ seeks jail terms and fines.36  In civil actions, the DOJ and the FTC 
generally seek injunctive relief and, where appropriate, damages.37  
Federal and state governments, like any other entity, may seek treble 
their actual damages where they have been injured in their business or 
property.38 
 
Private parties may seek injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 15 and also 
may secure treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.  Private 
parties must satisfy certain standing requirements39 and must demonstrate 
antitrust injury.40  The statute of limitations for Section 4 treble damage 
actions is four years.41   
It is also important to note that the U.S. antitrust laws are extraterritorial 
in their application and thus will generally govern conduct outside the 
United States that has an effect on competition in the United States.42 
                                                 
34   ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 1, 725, 603 (Debra J. Pearlstein 
ed., 5th ed., ABA 2002) 
35    ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 1, 725, 730 (Debra J. Pearlstein 
ed., 5th ed., ABA 2002) 
36     Id. 
37     See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its 
Practice, West Pub. Co., 534-36 (1994). 
38   15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  
39  See e.g. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519 (1983); Ill. Brick Co., v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
40  See e.g. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
41  15 U.S.C. § 15(b). 
42  See e.g. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945); Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582, n. 6 (1986); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993); U.S. v. Pilkington, Plc., 1994-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 70,842 (D. 
Ariz. 1994) (consent decree in settlement enjoining foreign licensing arrangements with 
anticompetitive impact on U.S. commerce). 
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E. Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws—General Caveats 
Antitrust is an area where potential liability can be difficult to predict.  
All three statutes quoted above use terms that are not capable of narrow 
definition and application: “restraint of trade,”43 “monopolize any part of 
the trade or commerce,”44 “substantially . . . lessen competition.”45  
Congress, in effect, has given the courts significant leeway in defining 
these terms and applying the terms to the facts of a particular case.  For 
many years, the uncertain scope of the laws was somewhat curtailed by 
the widespread use by the courts of per se prohibitions for various types 
of conduct, which were considered presumptively anticompetitive. 
However, over the past twenty-five years per se prohibitions have given 
way in many areas to a more nuanced rule of reason analysis that takes 
into account the likely economic consequences of a particular course of 
conduct. 
The basic focus of the antitrust inquiry is to determine whether the 
conduct under scrutiny is likely to harm consumers, for example by 
raising prices or restricting production of goods or services.  This leads to 
the inquiry of whether the conduct will serve to create or maintain 
monopoly power, or facilitate cartel behavior through which a group of 
firms is able to coordinate their activity so as to, in effect, jointly exercise 
monopoly power.  As a rule of thumb, highly competitive markets where 
firms have low market shares or where it would be easy for new entrants 
to compete do not attract much antitrust concern.  Conversely, restrictive 
conduct in highly concentrated markets with few competitors and high 
barriers to new entry is more likely to threaten the operation of 
competitive markets and is, therefore, closely scrutinized by the courts 
and antitrust agencies. 
Unfortunately, it often is not as simple as it may appear at first blush to 
distinguish procompetitive behavior from anticompetitive behavior.  The 
competitive process is complex, and the analysis of the effect of conduct 
on competition is similarly complex.  Conduct that superficially appears 
to be anticompetitive often can be demonstrated to involve no net welfare 
loss to society and in fact to have net procompetitive effects.46  The 
                                                 
43  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
44  Id. § 2. 
45  Id. § 18. 
46   To give one example, while tying arrangements were considered per se illegal for many years, 
most economists now agree that in certain circumstances tying can be efficient and 
procompetitive. See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets, in 
COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN 
Intellectual Property and Antitrust                              421 
Volume 43 — Number 4 
ability to analyze the economic effects of specific business transactions 
continues to improve as the base of experience grows and methods of 
economic analysis become more sophisticated and more accurate.   
The about-face by the Supreme Court in its analysis of antitrust legality 
of vertical restraints is an excellent example of the difficulty in 
distinguishing anticompetitive behavior from procompetitive behavior 
and the related difficulty of predicting whether courts will find certain 
behavior illegal.47  In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company,48 the 
Supreme Court found Schwinn's territorial system for distribution of its 
bicycles per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act because it 
impaired competition among Schwinn distributors.49   
Schwinn sparked controversy that in turn generated a considerable 
amount of scholarly work focusing on the economic effects of vertical 
arrangements.50  The consensus among academics was that territorial 
restrictions could have net procompetitive effects because manufacturers 
could use vertical restraints to better position their goods for interbrand 
competition against competing goods.51  Territorial restraints could be 
used to address the “free-rider phenomenon.”  In light of this analytical 
work, nine years later in Continental T.V., Incorporated v. GTE Sylvania 
Incorporated,52 the Supreme Court reversed its position and concluded 
that a per se illegal approach to territorial restraints is unsound.53  The 
                                                                                                                       
THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 29, 67-69 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Thomas M. Lenard eds., 
1999).  On the other hand, some conduct that used to be seen as relatively harmless, such as 
exclusive dealing contracts, are now understood to be more problematic.  A. Douglas Melamed, 
speech, Antitrust at the Turn of the Century (Fourth International Symposium on Competition 
Policy, Dec. 7, 1999) (available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/5232.htm>) (accessed Apr. 
17, 2003) 
 
47    Andrew I. Gavil, “A First Look at the Powel Papers:  Sylvania and the Process of Change in 
the Supreme Court,” 17 Antitrust 8 (2002). 
48  388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
49  Id. at 382. 
50     Id. at n 48. 
51     See, e.g., Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 299-300 (1978); Halverson, An 
Overview of the Legal and Economic Issues Regarding Vertical Arrangements, in 
ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 343-71 (1984); Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly 
Power, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 521, 523 (1984). 
52  433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
53     Id. at 57-58. 
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Court indicated that nonprice vertical restraints should be evaluated 
under the rule of reason.54  Thus, the lawfulness of a particular vertical 
restraint now depends upon whether the restraint on balance restricts or 
promotes competition.   
To assess the likelihood of antitrust liability based on conduct involving 
intellectual property, it is typically necessary to perform a rigorous 
economic analysis of the likely competitive effects of potential conduct.  
However, to assess the competitive effect of such conduct, it is necessary 
first to understand the nature and scope of the different intellectual 
property rights. 
II.  THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS 
Like the antitrust laws, the laws relating to intellectual property are 
aimed, in significant part, at fostering economic development.  The 
following section will briefly describe the laws in four main fields of 
intellectual property: patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets.  
However, there are not significant differences in the ways in which the 
antitrust laws interact with each form of intellectual property right.  The 
body of this article  will therefore for the most part focus on patent law, 
as that is where most of the cases impacting the antitrust laws have 
arisen.  Other forms of intellectual property rights will be discussed 
where relevant. 
A. Policy and Economics of Intellectual Property Law 
Economists have offered four principal rationales for the existence of 
intellectual property rights.55  According to Robert Stoner, these are as 
follows: 
  
(1)  Intellectual property rights provide an incentive to invent.  Without 
intellectual property rights, inventors might not be able to appropriate the 
full value of their inventions.  So-called free riders would be able to 
benefit from the results of innovation without actually investing in 
innovation themselves;   
                                                 
54     Id. at 52. 
55  See Robert Stoner, Presentation at FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Intellectual Property and 
Innovation (FTC/DOJ, Feb. 26, 2002) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect> (accessed Mar. 7, 
2003). 
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(2) Intellectual property rights lead to the broader dissemination of 
innovations.  Without the protection of intellectual property rights, 
inventors would be forced to keep their inventions secret in order to 
prevent free riding.  However, the patent laws allow for licenses, and 
give licenses value by protecting them against infringement. Also, the 
patent laws mandate a public disclosure of the intellectual property in a 
patent application; 
(3)  Intellectual property rights lead to a greater commercialization of 
inventions.  Intellectual property rights encourage the licensing of those 
property rights to entities that are better able to exploit those rights in an 
economically efficient manner; 
(4)  Patent rights assure the appropriability of inventions with a strong 
potential for follow-on innovation.  This will minimize the occurrence of 
duplicative research.56 
 
However, commentators disagree on the extent of IP protection that is 
desirable, and this issue was debated at the DOJ/FTC hearings on the 
intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law.57  Some suggest that 
the current system of intellectual property protection does little if 
anything to increase innovation and may actually harm the economy in 
various ways.58  Some of the potentially negative effects that the 
overextensive protection of intellectual property rights may result in are: 
 
Intellectual property rights may discourage second-generation 
innovation.59  As the cost of acquiring access to protected intellectual 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57  See Presentations at FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (FTC/DOJ, Feb., 2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
58  See Bronwyn H. Hall, Presentation at FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (FTC/DOJ, Feb. 26, 2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003) (calling patent system something 
of a necessary evil and stating that the evidence does not clearly show that the patent system 
increases innovation, with the possible exception of the pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and 
specialty chemicals fields).  See Michele Boldrin & David Levine, The Case Against 
Intellectual Property, vol. 92(2) Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers and Proceedings) 209-12 (2002). 
59  James Langenfeld, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Steps Toward Striking a Balance, 52 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 91, 96 (2001) (“As Landes and Posner point out, if intellectual 
property rights are enforced too strictly, then subsequent innovators who build upon earlier 
innovations will be foreclosed and overall welfare will be reduced. This principal also 
applies to patents and trade secrets.”); see also, James B. Kobak, Jr., Intellectual Property, 
424                         IDEA –The Journal of Law and Technology 
43 IDEA 413 (2003) 
property increases, the amount of research conducted using such property 
will decrease, all else being equal.60  
Intellectual property rights are a form of legalized monopoly, which can 
be harmful to a competitive economy for the reasons outlined in the 
previous section.61  In general, a monopolist will receive the greatest 
return by pricing at a level that excludes part of the market that is willing 
and able to pay above marginal cost for the product, thus creating a 
deadweight loss.62  
In addition, it has been noted that increasing the cost of information via 
intellectual property protection will lead to dynamic inefficiencies in the 
economy as a whole because market decisions will either not be fully 
informed or will be influenced by the cost of acquiring information.63 
Intellectual property rights can allow a company to leverage its 
possession of those rights in order to engage in anticompetitive behavior 
or monopolization beyond what is expressly allowed by the intellectual 
property grant.64   
 
In the intellectual property context, antitrust law in most concerned with 
preventing this last negative economic effect from occurring. 
B. The Patent Laws 
The patent laws are enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of 
the Constitution, which provides: “The Congress shall have Power . . . 
                                                                                                                       
Competition Law and Hidden Choices Between Original and Sequential Innovation, 3 Va. 
J.L. & Tech. 6 (1998).  
60    Harvey S. Perlman, Symposium: Taking Stock: The Law and Economics of Intellectual 
Property Rights: Taking the Protection-Access Tradeoff Seriously, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1831, 
1834-35 (2000) (pointing out that while licensing can encourage further investment, 
transaction costs, externalities, strategic behavior, and uncertainty can all decrease the 
effectiveness of the licensing process). 
61  Langenfield, supra, at 96-97 (“Moreover, if an innovator were allowed to keep all of the 
surplus from an innovation through extended property rights, then there would be no benefit 
to the rest of society from the innovation. As such, innovations would not drive the economy 
forward to more productivity, but would only enrich the inventor.”).  
62   James Boyle, Symposium: Taking Stock: The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property 
Rights: Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital 
Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2007, 2013 (2000). 
63    Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1980). 
64     See generally, Id. at 99. 
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[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”  
The Patent Act provides:  “Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”65  The owner of a 
patent generally may exclude others from infringing that patent by 
making, using, or selling the patented invention.66   
1. The Patent Grant 
The patent grant functions to encourage investment in the discovery of 
new technologies.  The amount a firm will invest in developing new 
technologies generally will depend upon the perceived financial reward 
from its investment; the patent grant is intended to increase this perceived 
reward.  It does so by offering the investor the right for 20 years to 
exclude all competitors from making, using, or selling certain 
technological advances that result from the investment.67  This right to 
exclude is made contingent on the disclosure of certain details of the 
invention in the patent application, which are then made available to any 
interested members of the public.68 
This right to exclude can enable the investor to appropriate much of the 
value to society that results from the technological advance.  Absent such 
protection, “free riders” who did not make the investment that resulted in 
discovery of the technology may be able to copy the technology and 
appropriate much of its value for themselves.  The ability of “free riders” 
to appropriate the benefits of a new technology serves as a deterrent to 
those considering an investment in developing such technologies.  The 
exclusive patent grant eliminates this deterrent and thereby increases the 
perceived value of the patent and hence encourages increased investment 
in technology development. 
There are a number of interesting issues in patent policy that have arisen 
over the past several years that have in turn had an impact on the 
interface between competition and IP law.  Many of these issues were 
                                                 
65  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
66  Id. §§ 154, 271. 
67  Id. § 154. 
68  Id. 
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addressed at the FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy.69   
2. Licensing of Patents 
A patent license is essentially an agreement by a patent holder not to sue 
a licensee for what would otherwise be infringement of its patent.  
Licenses can either be non-exclusive, conveying the bare right not to be 
sued for infringement, or exclusive, also conveying the right to exclude 
others from exploiting the patent in the field covered by the license. 
The patent grant always includes the right to license.70  This is a common 
law right that has not been codified.71  The validity of a license is 
determined by standard contract principles, including the requirement of 
good consideration.72  
There are two main economic rationales for licensing.  First, the grant of 
a license provides the recipient with the option to use a technology that it 
otherwise could not use.  Second, licensing permits the patent owner to 
increase its financial reward from investing in the patent.  Each of these 
rationales will be discussed in more depth later in this article.73 
C. The Copyright Laws 
The copyright laws also were enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8, of the Constitution.  The Copyright Act74 provides:  
 
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, 
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of 
a machine or device . . . 
                                                 
69  See e.g. Panel on Substantive Standards of Patentability (Apr. 10, 2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020410trans.pdf> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003).  See discussion 
infra at section XIII. 
70  Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
71  L. L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroiloid, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 857, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).  
72  Davis Airfoils v. U.S., 124 F. Supp. 350, 352 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
73  See discussion of procompetitive benefits of licensing at infra, section VII (A). 
74     17 U.S.C. § 102. 
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(b)   In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extent to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.75 
 
The copyright system differs from the patent system in a number of 
ways, most prominently: (1) copyright protection exists from the moment 
of a work’s creation (although registration is a prerequisite to 
enforcement); (2) the copyright system is a registration system, and 
applications receive relatively limited scrutiny; (3) copying is required 
for infringement of a copyright but not for infringement of a patent, and; 
(4) copyrights are subject to certain defenses and limitations not present 
in patent law, such as fair use.76  
D. The Trademark Laws 
The federal trademark system is a supplement to state law systems that 
recognize common law marks.  State common law trademarks are not 
preempted by federal law, but federal registration provides broader 
rights. 
Trademarks distinguish goods with respect to their source.  The 
Trademark Act of 1946 (The Lanham Act) § 1052 provides:  “No 
trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from 
the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register 
on account of its nature . . ..”77  The statute goes on to enumerate certain 
exceptions to the general proposition listed in Section 1052 that relate to 
social concerns (i.e., immoral or scandalous material, the flag of the 
United States), or to economic concerns.  Section 1052(d) provides:  “[A] 
mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and 
not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the 
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive . . ..” may not be registered.  Unlike with patents and copyrights, 
trademark protection is not limited in time. 
E. Trade Secrets (Know-How) 
                                                 
75  Id. 
76  Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust vol. 1, § 2.3a, 2-32 to 2-33 (Aspen L. & Bus. 
Supp. 2003). 
77  15 U.S.C. § 1052. 
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Trade secrets, sometimes called know-how, comprises knowledge that 
has economic value essentially because it is not known to others.  The list 
of potentially protectable trade secrets is vast, and includes “formulas, 
manufacturing processes, product specifications and drawings, marketing 
plans, customer lists, computer software, R&D information, and special 
price and cost data.”78  The protection of trade secrets is essentially a 
matter of state law.79   
 Possessors of trade secrets are protected in their advantage primarily by 
general laws against theft.  The owner of a trade secret has no recourse 
against somebody who discovers or reproduces the know-how through 
independent development or innovation.  When a trade secret is licensed, 
the extent to which the licensor can thereafter limit the licensee's use of 
know-how generally depends upon restrictions included in the contract. 
III.  THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 
According to the Federal Circuit, both competition law and intellectual 
property law “are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and 
competition.”80  However, in practice there has always been considerable 
tension between the two bodies of law.  Intellectual property law 
provides for government-granted temporary monopolies, while 
competition law tries to prevent monopolization from occurring.81  From 
                                                 
78  William C. Holmes, Intellectual Property and Antitrust vol. 1, § 2.01, 2-2 (West 2002). 
79      ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 1, 1106 (Debra J. Pearlstein ed., 
5th ed., ABA 2002). 
80  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing 
Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see  Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, § 1.0 (April 6, 1995) [hereinafter 
Licensing Guidelines] <www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm> (accessed Mar. 7, 
2003) (“The intellectual property laws and antitrust laws share the common purpose of 
promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”).  Some commentators disagree 
with this perception of identical underlying goals.  See e.g. Suzanne Scotchmer, Discussion 
at FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy, Competition Policy and Innovation: The Context of 
Cumulative Innovation (FTC/DOJ, Feb. 26, 2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020226suzanneandersonscotchmer.pdf  > (accessed Mar. 
7, 2003) (saying that while it is true that both antitrust laws and intellectual property laws are 
aimed at improving consumer welfare, the real question is what kind of consumer welfare 
should be improved.  Innovation is a component of welfare, but so are lower prices through 
competition.). 
81  See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981) (“While the antitrust 
laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the inventor 
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an economist’s point of view, intellectual property law is primarily 
concerned with the provision of appropriate ex ante incentives (and 
increasing competition in innovation markets) while antitrust law is 
primarily concerned with ex post incentives (and increasing competition 
in product markets).82  
 The broad questions for courts and policymakers to decide, then, 
is how to find an economically optimal equilibrium, so that innovation 
can be encouraged while anticompetitive behavior in product markets can 
be kept to a minimum.  According to Landes and Posner, for copyright 
law to promote economic efficiency, it “must, at least approximately, 
maximize the benefits from creating additional works minus both the 
losses from limiting access and the costs of administering [intellectual 
property] protection.”83 
In recent years, economists that have looked at this equilibrium have 
increasingly come to the conclusion that promoting innovation is of far 
greater importance to the economy than avoiding access limitations.84  
This realization has in turn led economists to address the conceptually 
simpler (but in practice very controversial) question of what type of 
competition policy can best bring about an optimal level of innovation.85 
                                                                                                                       
with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented 
art.”).  The Supreme Court has observed that the granting of patents "is an exception to the 
general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market." Walker 
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (quoting 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)). 
82  See Patrick Rey, Presentation at FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (May 22, 2002).  
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522reydoc.pdf 
83  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. 
Leg. Stud. 325, 326 (1989).  This principle would apply equally to other forms of intellectual 
property. 
84  See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 
(Jan. 2002); William F. Baxter, Antitrust Law and Technological Innovation, Issues Sci. & 
Tech., Winter 1985, at 80, 82 ("The contribution of technological advances to our economic 
well-being is very substantial when compared with the damage that could be caused by 
restrictive behavior the antitrust laws seek to halt."); F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and 
Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 998, 1018 (1987) (productive efficiency is "much more 
important quantitatively than allocative efficiency, and dynamic efficiency is almost surely 
even more important"); Donald F. Turner, Basic Principles in Formulating Antitrust and 
Misuse Constraints on the Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 Antitrust L.J. 485, 
485 (1985) ("[I]n the long run, technological progress contributes far more to consumer 
welfare than does the elimination of allocative inefficiencies caused by noncompetitive 
pricing."). 
85    Langenfeld, at  92. 
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A. Schumpeter’s Theory of Monopolies Leading to Innovation 
This question was first breached by Joseph Schumpeter in 1942.86  He 
argued that the main motors for technological innovation were companies 
with monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic powers.87  He saw monopolies 
as better able to invest more resources in research and development due 
to their size, and more willing to do so because they could later recoup 
the entire profits stemming from their innovation without sharing them 
with free-riding competitors.88  Schumpeter also noted that monopolies 
were under constant challenge from newer technologies, so those 
monopolies that did not innovate well were likely to be replaced by new 
monopolies that were more effective innovators.89 
 Schumpeter’s general theories on innovation and competition 
were expanded upon in the intellectual property context by Edmund 
Kitch.90  Kitch argued that broad patent rights that effectively conferred a 
monopoly on "prospects" (i.e. “upstream research far removed from 
commercial use”) are economically beneficial for two reasons.91  First, 
the patent rights would provide  development incentives by allowing the 
prospect owner to  fully gain the benefits of such development (thus 
echoing Schumpeter’s main point).92  And second, the early and broad 
patent right would allow coordination of development efforts, which 
would the decrease duplicative investments in development.93 
B. Responses to Schumpeter’s Theories 
                                                 
86  See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 100-106 (3d ed., Harper 
& Row 1950). 
87     Id. 
88  Id. at 81-106. 
89  Id. at 83. 
90  See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265, 
276 (1977). 
91  Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: the Role of 
Patents and Antitrust, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 813, 819 (2001). 
92      Id. 
93     Id. 
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Kenneth Arrow, among others, has challenged Schumpeter’s conclusion 
that monopolies foster innovation.94  Arrow points out that a monopolist 
would have no incentive to create a new or superior product if the profits 
from that product would only eat into the profits on the monopolist’s 
current products.95  Arrow posits that the risk of duplicative investment is 
overblown.  According to Rebecca Eisenberg, duplicative investments 
are not a major problem because competing researchers can arrive at 
different results at a quicker pace and multiple discoveries help establish 
the validity of new research claims.96 Robert Merges and Richard Nelson 
add that as an empirical matter patent holders do not seem to coordinate 
innovation in an effective manner through tailored licensing.97 
There has not been a decisive resolution to the debate over whether or not 
competition promotes innovation.  The empirical studies that have been 
done are equivocal.98  According to Howard Shelanski, the absence of 
convincing evidence that any of the hypotheses regarding firm size or 
industry concentration and innovation are right or wrong leads to 
uncertainty, and therefore the anticompetitive effects of concentration in 
innovation markets should not be assumed but rather examined on a case 
by case basis.99 
IV.  THE GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
In 1995 the DOJ and FTC collectively issued guidelines (“Licensing 
Guidelines”) for the licensing of intellectual property, to help clarify the 
agencies’ enforcement position.100  They are helpful for giving clearer 
guidance to companies and law enforcers, and in many respects advance 
                                                 
94     See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in 
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609-25 (Natl. 
Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962). 
95  Id. at 611-612. 
96  See Rebecca Eisenberg, 56 U.Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1063-64 (1999) (citing Robert K. Merton, 
The Sociology of Science 378-80 (Chicago, 1973)). 
97  See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 839, 875 (1990). 
98  Rai, supra, at 827.   
99  See Howard Shelanski, Presentation at FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (FTC/DOJ, Feb. 25, 2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
100  Licensing Guidelines, supra.  
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the law.  Perhaps the most important feature of the Licensing Guidelines 
is the provision of safe harbors, in which licensing provisions will be 
considered lawful, absent extraordinary circumstances.101  The majority of 
licensing agreements probably fall into one of the safe harbors. 
A. General Principals 
The Licensing Guidelines embody three general principles: (1) for the 
purpose of antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual property as 
being essentially comparable to any other form of property;102 (2) the 
Agencies do not presume that intellectual property creates market power 
in the antitrust context;103 and (3) the Agencies recognize that intellectual 
property licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of 
production and is generally procompetitive.104 The Licensing Guidelines 
represent an important move away from the standards of the 1970s and 
early 1980s (which were based on whether the patent holder had 
“misused” the patent), toward an effects-based approach. 
                                                 
101     Id. § 4.3. 
102  Id. § 2.0(a). This proposition has been criticized as overly simplistic.  Commentators have 
argued that intellectual property actually differs from ordinary property in a number of 
different ways.  See e.g. Langenfeld, supra, at 93-94 (stating that (1) “intellectual property 
often embodies advancements that produce significant cost and performance advantages;” 
(2) “successful exploitation of intellectual property usually requires the owner to combine it 
with assets owned by others;” (3) “intellectual property is accompanied by strong free-rider 
characteristics,” and (4) “inventors often assume substantial costs which are generally not 
recoverable if the research does not lead to a commercial product)”; Richard J. Gilbert & 
Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual Property 
Guidelines Five Years Later, (Competition Policy Ctr. Working Paper No. CPC01-020) 
(May 3, 2001) <http://respositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC01-020> (arguing that (1) the 
power of exclusion in patent grants is broader than that in ordinary property; (2) the 
boundaries of intellectual property defy accurate survey to a much greater extent than with 
tangible property, and (3) the statutory language governing use of the property differs from 
one form of property to another); James Rogan, Presentation at FTC/DOJ Hearings on 
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy 
(FTC/DOJ, Feb. 6, 2002) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003) 
(saying that intellectual property rights are of particular importance because they are 
specifically provided for in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution).  
103  Licensing Guidelines, supra n. 87 § 2.0(b); see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 
466 U.S. 2, 37-38 n. 7 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 
157 F.3d 1340, 1367 & n. 7 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354-
55 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“A patent does not of itself establish a presumption of market power in 
the antitrust sense.”). 
104  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 2.0(c).  
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As is the case with other property transfers, intellectual property 
licensing arrangements are generally divided for analytical purposes into 
horizontal and vertical relationships.105  Licensing arrangements have a 
vertical component where they involve activities in a complimentary 
relationship.  For example, this is the case when a company whose 
primary business is product manufacturing acquires a license from a 
company whose primary business is research and development.106  A 
restraint in a vertical arrangement can harm competition if it 
“anticompetitively forecloses access to, or increases competitors' costs of 
obtaining, important inputs, or facilitates coordination to raise price or 
restrict output.”107 
Licensing arrangements can also have horizontal aspects, which is the 
case where the licensee and licensor “would have been actual or likely 
potential competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the 
license.”108  A restraint in a horizontal licensing arrangement can harm 
competition if it “increase[s] the risk of coordinated pricing, output 
restrictions, or the acquisition or maintenance of market power.”109  
The Licensing Guidelines provide that in most cases, restraints in 
intellectual property licensing arrangements are to be evaluated under the 
rule of reason, by weighing a restraint’s pro and anticompetitive effects.110  
The agencies do not require the theoretically least restrictive means of 
achieving an efficiency but rather ask whether “the parties could have 
achieved similar efficiencies by means that are significantly less 
restrictive.”111 
However, the Licensing Guidelines recognize that in certain instances, a 
“restraint's ‘nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive’ 
that it should be treated as unlawful per se, without an elaborate inquiry 
into the restraint's likely competitive effect.”112  Restraints that have been 
                                                 
105  Id. § 3.3.  The courts and agencies take a relatively more permissive approach toward 
vertical agreements than they do toward horizontal agreements. See e.g. Generac Corp. v. 
Caterpillar Inc., 172 F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir. 1999). 
106  Licensing Guidelines, supra,  § 3.3. 
107  Id. § 4.1.1. 
108  Id. § 3.3. 
109  Id. § 4.1.1. 
110  Id. § 3.4; see Ind. Fedn. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447; Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85; Broad. 
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law vol. 7, § 1502 (2d ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2003). 
111  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 4.2. 
112  Id. § 3.4 (citations omitted). 
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held per se illegal by courts include: “[n]aked price-fixing, output 
restraints, and market division among horizontal competitors, as well as 
certain group boycotts and resale price maintenance.”113  “To determine 
whether a particular restraint in a licensing arrangement is given per se or 
rule of reason treatment, the Agencies will assess whether the restraint in 
question can be expected to contribute to an efficiency-enhancing 
integration of economic activity.”114   
B. Types of Markets 
The Licensing Guidelines identify three different types of markets that 
may be affected by licensing arrangements: goods markets; technology 
markets; and innovation markets.115  Goods markets are most familiar to 
standard antitrust analysis and are delineated as in Section 1 of the 
Merger Guidelines.116  Licensing restraints can have competitive effects 
on markets for final or intermediate goods that use intellectual property, 
or in upstream markets for goods that are used as inputs, along with 
intellectual property, in the production of other goods.117   
Technology markets include “the intellectual property that is licensed 
(the "licensed technology") and its close substitutes—that is, the 
technologies or goods that are close enough substitutes significantly to 
constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the intellectual 
property that is licensed.”118  When IP rights are marketed separately from 
the products encompassing the intellectual property, technology markets 
may be used to analyze competitive effect.119   
                                                 
113  Id.   
114  Id. 
115 Id. §§ 3.2-3.2.3. 
116  Merger Guidelines, supra, § 1.1. 
117  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 3.2.1. 
118  Id. § 3.2.2. 
119  Id.; see e.g. U.S. v. Pilkington Plc. (D. Ariz. May 25, 1994) (DOJ alleged that licensing 
restraints harmed competition in licensing of float glass technology); In the Matter of 
Montedison S.P.A., 119 F.T.C. 676, 683 (F.T.C. 1995) (FTC alleged that proposed joint 
venture would lessen competition in licensing of polypropylene technology and 
polypropylene catalyst technology); In the Matter of The Dow Chem. Co., 2001 F.T.C. 
LEXIS 27, *10-*11 (Mar. 15, 2001) (complaint Dkt. No. C-3999) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bc/caselist/index.htm> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003) (FTC alleged that 
Dow’s acquisition of Union Carbide would lessen competition in licensing of polyethylene 
reactor technology and catalyst technology). 
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Finally, the Licensing Guidelines recognize the existence of innovation 
markets.120  While many licensing arrangements can be assessed within 
the relevant markets for goods or technology, in some instances the 
analysis will require the delineation of a market for innovation in and of 
itself.121  “An innovation markets consists of the research and 
development directed to particular new or improved goods or processes, 
and the close substitutes for that research and development.”122  Close 
substitutes include: “research and development efforts, technologies, and 
goods that significantly constrain the exercise of market power with 
respect to the relevant research and development.”123  The FTC and DOJ 
will delineate innovation markets “only when the capabilities to engage 
in the relevant research and development can be associated with 
specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms.”124 Innovation 
market theory has been applied to mergers, joint ventures, and 
intellectual property licensing.125  The use of innovation markets is 
controversial.126  Critics note that it is often very hard to define an 
innovation market, especially where the innovation relates to a good that 
did not previously exist.127 
C. Safe Harbors 
                                                 
120     Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 3.2.3  
121  Id.; see generally M. Howard Morse, The Limits of Innovation Markets, in Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property, The Intellectual Property Committee Newsletter, vol. 2, No. 1, at 22-
35 (Spring 2001) also available at 
<http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/committees/intell_property/559817-2.pdf> (accessed Mar. 
7, 2003). 
122  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 3.2.3. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  See e.g. In the Matter of Hoechst AG, 2000 F.T.C. LEXIS 3, *9  (Jan. 18, 2000) (complaint 
Dkt. No. C-3919) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/index.htm> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003) 
(alleging merger would reduce innovation competition and raise barriers to entry); Ciba-
Geigy, infra.     and accompanying text; see David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven, Antitrust 
Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Industry Mergers, 54 Food Drug L.J. 255 (1999) (discussing 
FTC's application of innovation markets analysis to mergers in pharmaceutical industry).  
126  See e.g. Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger 
Analysis, 64 Antitrust L.J. 19 (1995); Robert J. Hoerner, Innovation Markets: New Wine in 
Old Bottles, 64 Antitrust L.J. 49 (1995). 
127  Rai, supra, at 827. 
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The Licensing Guidelines also establish important safe harbors in which 
conduct will be considered lawful, absent extraordinary circumstances.128  
The safe harbors standards differ according to whether the relevant 
market is a goods market, technology market, or innovation market.129  
When the relevant market is a goods market, a proposed licensing 
arrangement falls within the safety zone if it is ¨(1) not facially 
anticompetitive and (2) the licensor and its licensees collectively account 
for no more than twenty percent of each relevant goods market 
significantly affected by the restraint.¨130  When the relevant market is a 
technology market, a proposed licensing arrangement falls within the 
safety zone if it is (1) not facially anticompetitive and (2) there are at 
least four independently controlled substitute technologies.131  When the 
relevant market is an innovation market, a licensing arrangement falls 
within the safety zone if (1) it is not facially anticompetitive and (2) there 
are at least four independently controlled entities in addition to the parties 
to the licensing agreement that have the incentive, assets, and 
characteristics necessary to engage in research and development that is a 
close substitute for the activities of licensee and licensor.132  The safety 
zone is inapplicable to transfers of intellectual property rights when a 
merger analysis is applied.133  
V.  THE ACQUISITION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
A. Antitrust Concerns Stemming From the Acquisition of 
Intellectual Property From Third Parties 
                                                 
128  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 4.3. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  Id.  The DOJ/FTC Joint Venture Guidelines provide a somewhat broader safety zone for 
innovation markets, only requiring that “three or more independently controlled research 
efforts in addition to those of the collaboration possess the required specialized assets or 
characteristics and the incentive to engage in R&D that is a close substitute for the R&D 
activity of the collaboration” for a collaboration to fall into the agencies’ safety zone. 
DOJ/FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, 4 Trade Reg.  Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 13,161, § 4.3 (Apr. 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines/pdf> 
(accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
132  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 4.3. 
133  Id.  
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Patent acquisitions generally produce significant efficiencies, for 
example by allowing the introduction of new products into the market 
and by providing an incentive to invent. However, in some instances, 
patent acquisitions can be anticompetitive.   
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
can apply to acquisitions of intellectual property from third parties.134  
Section 7 applies to acquisition of all assets, including intellectual 
property.135  
The basic economic analysis for evaluating an acquisition of rights to 
intellectual property is no different than the Section 7 Clayton Act 
analysis that would apply for the acquisition of any other type of 
property.  The relevant markets must be defined and the effect of the 
acquisition of the intellectual property in those markets must be assessed. 
 The courts have recognized a number of instances where patent 
acquisitions were deemed unlawful as part of a broader monopolistic 
scheme or conspiracy to restrain trade.136  For example, in Kobe, 
Incorporated v. Dempsey Pump Company,137 the court found that when 
combined with other anticompetitive acts, the acquisition of every 
important patent in a field with the purpose of excluding competitors 
constituted a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.138 
Exclusive Licenses  
 One critical issue in looking at challenges to the acquisition of 
intellectual property rights is whether the acquisitions are exclusive or 
non-exclusive.  An acquisition is considered to be exclusive if any aspect 
of the license is exclusive (e.g., exclusive in a particular territory or for a 
particular use) but is deemed non-exclusive if the licensor retains the 
unrestricted right to use the licensed intellectual property or license it to 
                                                 
134     Id. at § 5.7. 
135  15 U.S.C. § 18.  
136    See, e.g., United States v. Parker Rust-Proof Company, 61 F.Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945); 
United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F.Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich 1951); Kobe, Incorporated v. 
Dempsey Pump Company, 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 
F.2d 1195 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
137  198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952). 
138  Id. at 423; see ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 2, 1036 (Debra J. 
Pearlstein ed., 5th ed., ABA 2002). 
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others.139  Non-exclusive arrangements that do not contain restraints on 
competitive conduct are not likely to implicate antitrust concerns, while 
exclusive licenses or outright purchases can be more problematic, 
especially when the agreement contains restraints.140  A putative non-
exclusive license can be de facto exclusive if so indicated by the 
surrounding circumstances.141   
 According to the Seventh Circuit in L.G. Balfour Company v. 
Federal Trade Commission,142 while the mere accumulation of 
intellectual property rights is not normally an antitrust offense, when a 
monopoly acquires exclusive licenses that are a prerequisite for 
participation in the relevant market, and competitors do not have an equal 
opportunity to procure the needed licenses, the monopolist may be guilty 
of monopolization.143  Areeda and Hovenkamp propose that the 
acquisition by a monopolist of exclusive rights in related patents should 
be considered a presumptive violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
but a monopolist should be allowed to acquire exclusive rights in 
unrelated patents and non-exclusive rights in any patent.144 
 Exclusive licenses of patents are reportable under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act145 if the two parties are of sufficiently large size and the 
                                                 
139  See Bruce J. Prager, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Pre-merger Notification Practice 
Manual 45 (ABA 1991). 
140  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 4.1.2; see e.g. In the Matter of FMC Corp. & Asahi Chem. 
Indus. Co., 2002 F.T.C. LEXIS 32, *7-*8  (June 12, 2002) (complaint Dkt. No. C-4051) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bc/caselist> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003) (exclusive trademark licensing 
agreement that was alleged to include an unwritten market allocation scheme); U.S. v. Am. 
Natl. Can Co., 61 Fed. Reg. 34,862 (1996) (exclusive license for laminated toothpaste tubes 
along with agreement not to manufacture laminated tubes in the United States granted in 
exchange for agreement not to manufacture tube-making equipment).  
141  Licensing Guidelines, supra, at Example 11; see U.S. v. S.C. Johnson & Son Inc., 1995-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,884 (N.D. Ill. 1994), 59 Fed Reg. 43,859 (Aug. 25, 1994) (DOJ 
alleged that a nominally nonexclusive license for household insecticides was de facto 
exclusive since the licensor refused all other offers to license and refrained from using the 
technology itself). See generally, David Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis 
to Promote Network Competition, 7 George Mason L. Rev. 523 (May 1999). 
142  442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971). 
143  Id. at 15-16. 
144  Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law vol. 3 § 707(a) (2d ed., Aspen L. & 
Bus. 2002). 
145  15 U.S.C. § 18(a). 
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transaction is considered a legal transfer with a value of $50 million or 
more.146 
a. Lilly/Sepracor147 
 Lilly, owner of the drug Prozac, sought an exclusive license to the 
rights of R-fluoxetine, a follow-on antidepressant that was a potential 
competitor to Prozac.148  R-fluoxetine was produced by Sepracor.  Lilly's 
Prozac patents were going to expire in 2004, while Sepracor's R-
fluoxetine patent was not due to expire until 2015.149  
 This scenario raised two main concerns.  First, there was the 
general concern that arises when a dominant firm buys a potential 
competing product.150 Second, there was the concern about the 
competitive implications of a potential share-shifting strategy.151 With the 
rights to R-fluoxetine, Lilly could potentially introduce R-fluoxetine in 
the waning years of the Prozac patent in an attempt to market it as a 
replacement or improvement on Prozac.152 Since the new drug was patent 
protected, this might shield Lilly's overall market share from generic 
competition.153 
 After a thorough investigation, the FTC voted to allow the 
transaction to proceed unchallenged.154  The first concern was lessened by 
the fact that the market could be defined quite broadly to include many 
                                                 
146  15 U.S.C. § 18(a), as amended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
Amendments of February 1, 2001, Pub.L. 106-102, Title I, § 133(c), 113 Stat. 1383 (1999).  
147  There is no public decision, but the investigation was discussed in a speech by 
Commissioner Anthony. See Sheila F. Anthony, Speech before the ABA Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property: The Crossroads Program, Riddles and Lessons from the Prescription 
Drug Wars: Antitrust Implications of Certain Types of Agreements Involving Intellectual 
Property, (San Francisco, Cal., June 1, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/anthony.htm> 
(accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
148    Id. 
149     Id. 
150    Id. 
151    Id. (“I was concerned about the competitive implications of a potential share-shifting 
strategy. For example, with the rights to R-fluoxetine, Lilly could introduce R-fluoxetine in 
the waning years of the Prozac patent and attempt to market it in such a way as to move its 
Prozac share to the new drug.”) http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/anthony/sfip000601.htm 
152    Id. 
153     Id. 
154 Id.  
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other antidepressants.155  The second concern of share-switching was not 
considered to be a real risk, according to Commissioner Anthony, 
because she trusted doctors and patients to see the real worth of the 
competing products.156  Efficiencies also played a role in the decision not 
to challenge the merger, at least according to former Chairman Pitofsky, 
who noted that Lilly’s distribution resources and scientific expertise 
increased the likelihood that R-fluoxetine would reach the market 
quickly.157 
b. Biovail158 
 Biovail is a Canadian manufacturer of branded and generic 
pharmaceutical products.  One of its largest-selling brands is Tiazac, a 
prescription drug used to treat high blood pressure and chronic chest 
pain.159  Andrx, a Florida-based company, filed an application to market a 
generic version of Tiazac.160  Biovail immediately sued Andrx for 
infringement, which, under the terms of the Hatch-Waxman Act, delayed 
the generic’s entry into the market.161  Andrx won, but before it could start 
production of the generic drug, it was sued once more by Biovail for 
infringement of a different patent (the ‘463 patent).162  This patent had 
been acquired by Biovail from a third company (DOV) in an exclusive 
licensing agreement.163 
The FTC alleged that Biovail illegally acquired exclusive licensing rights 
to the ‘463 patent in order to protect its monopoly in the market for 
                                                 
155     Id. 
156  Id.  
157  Robert Pitofsky, Speech before the Antitrust and Technology Conference, Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, (Berkeley Ctr. 
for L. & Tech. Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Cal., Mar. 2, 2001) in 16 Berkley Tech. L.J. 535 
(June/July, 2001), also available at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ipf301.htm> 
(accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
158  In the Matter of Biovail Corp., 2002 F.T.C. LEXIS 56 (Oct. 4, 2002) (consent order Dkt. No. 
C-4060) <(http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/04/biovailtiazac.htm). > (accessed Mar. 7, 2003).  
159     Id.  
160     Id.at n 157. 
161  See Biovail Corp. Intl. v. Andrx Pharm. Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D. Fla.  2000).  
162    Id. 
163    Id. 
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Tiazac and generic versions of Tiazac.164  The FTC also alleged that 
Biovail illegally maintained its monopoly by wrongfully listing the 
acquired patent in the Orange Book165 and making misleading statements 
to the FDA.166 
The case was settled under a consent order under which Biovail was: (1) 
required to divest part of the exclusive rights to the ‘463 patent back to 
DOV; (2) prohibited from taking any action that would trigger additional 
statutory stays on final FDA approval of a generic form of Tiazac; and 
(3) prohibited from wrongfully listing any patents in the Orange Book for 
a product for which the company already has an FDA-approved New 
Drug Application.167 
B. Mergers and Acquisitions 
When two companies with intellectual property holdings combine 
through a merger or acquisition, many of the same issues arise as with 
acquisitions of intellectual property in isolation.  However, there are also 
many practical legal differences.  Mergers involve procedural 
requirements to notify the FTC and DOJ of any possible antitrust issues 
through Hart-Scott-Rodino filings, with the possibility of a legal 
challenge by one of the agencies.168   
Mergers are typically challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,169 
although Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act can also be used.170  
Traditionally, merger analysis has been divided into analysis of 
                                                 
164    Id. 
165  The Orange Book is a list of patents identified by branded drug companies as covering 
specific products that is published by the FDA under the framework of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act. <http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm> (updated Jan. 29, 2003). 
166     Id. at n 157. 
167  Wrongful "Orange Book" Listing Raises Red Flag with FTC; Leads to Consent Order with 
Biovail Corp. Concerning its Drug Tiazac, F.T.C. Press Release (Apr. 23, 2002) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/04/index.htm> (accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
168    15 U.S.C. § 18 (a). 
169  15 U.S.C. § 18; see generally Ramon A. Klitzke, Patents and Section 7 of the Clayton Act: 
The Significance of Patents in Corporate Acquisitions, 12 Loy. U. L.J. 401 (1981). 
170  See e.g. U.S. v. Rockford Meml. Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990) (acquisition that could 
not be challenged under section 7 of Clayton Act was successfully challenged under section 
1 of Sherman Act); McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 537 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1982), 
aff’d in part, 722 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1983) (challenging merger under section 2 of Sherman 
Act as an illegal act of monopolization). 
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horizontal and vertical mergers.  The Agencies have broad leeway in 
formulating appropriate consent orders to deal with innovation concerns 
in mergers, or indeed in blocking the merger from taking place.171   
Antitrust analyses of both horizontal and vertical mergers increasingly 
involve the examination of issues relating to intellectual property rights 
and innovation.  From 1990 to 1994, the FTC and DOJ identified 
innovation concerns in their challenges of four mergers, while from 1995 
to 1999, the agencies cited innovation concerns in challenging 47 
different proposed mergers.172  Meanwhile, it has also become common 
for companies to defend proposed mergers on grounds that the combined 
company will be able to develop new products more efficiently because 
the merging companies possess complementary intellectual property 
rights.173 
In a March 2001 speech,174 Robert Pitofsky, former Chairman of the 
Federal Trade Commission, illustrated the FTC’s consideration of 
intellectual property concerns as demonstrated in Ciba-Geiby/Sandoz,175 a 
1996 horizontal merger, and Silicon Graphics,176 a 1995 case involving 
the acquisition of two manufacturers of complementary products. 
1. Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz 
In Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, the FTC´s complaint alleged the existence of a 
market for the development of gene therapy products, even though at the 
time there were no such products available that had been licensed by 
FDA.177  The complaint noted that the first products would not be 
available until the year 2000, but that the market could grow to forty-five 
                                                 
171      See generally, David A. Balto and James F. Mongoven, “Antitrust Remedies in High 
Technology Industries,” Antitrust Report 22 (January 1999). 
http://www.whitecase.com/article_antitrust_remedies_high_technology_balto.pdf .  The 
authors discuss the various remedies available to the Agencies. 
172  Gilbert, supra (claiming that the actual impact of innovation concerns on merger policy is 
somewhat less than these numbers would indicate because most of the mergers that have 
been challenged on that basis could also have been effectively challenged on other 
conventional grounds as well.). 
173    Pitofsky, supra. 
174  Id.  
175    Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842 (F.T.C. Mar. 24, 1997) (consent order Dkt. No. C-3725). 
176  See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 120 F.T.C. 928, 931 (F.T.C. Nov. 14, 1995) (Dkt. No. C-
3626). 
177  Balto, supra. 
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billion dollars by the year 2010.178  The FTC alleged that this merger 
would harm competition in a broad gene therapy R&D market.  
 The complaint also alleged that the merger would harm 
competition in the research and development, manufacture, and sale of 
(1) herpes simplex virus-thymidine kinase (HSV-tk) gene therapy for the 
treatment of cancer, (2) HSV-tk gene therapy for the treatment of graft 
versus host disease, (3) gene therapy for the treatment of hemophilia, and 
(4) chemoresistance gene therapy.179 
 The technology at issue concerned the treatment of disease 
through manipulation of genetic material and insertion or reinsertion into 
a patient's cells.180  Although many firms were conducting research into 
gene therapies, the merging firms were two of only a few entities with 
the intellectual property rights and other assets necessary for 
commercialization of such therapies.181  The firms' combined position in 
gene therapy research was so dominant that other firms doing research in 
this area needed to enter into joint ventures, or contract with either Ciba-
Geigy or Sandoz, to have any hope of commercializing their own 
research efforts.182  In particular, they possessed an over-whelming 
amount of R&D resources, making it necessary for firms seeking to 
conduct research and development in this area to contract with one firm 
or the other.183 Competition between the two firms facilitated joint 
ventures and contracts on reasonable terms.184 Without competition, the 
combined entity could have appropriated most of the commercial value 
of other firms' research, leading to a substantial decrease in such 
                                                 
178  Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. at 845.  
179  Id. at 844-45. 
180     See generally, David A. Balto and James F. Mongoven, “Antitrust Remedies in High 
Technology Industries,” Antitrust Report 22 (January 1999). 
http://www.whitecase.com/article_antitrust_remedies_high_technology_balto.pdf .  The 
authors discuss the various remedies available to the Agencies. 
181    Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. at 845. 
182    Id. 
183    Id. 
184     In the Matter of Ciba-Geigy, FTC Docket No. C-3725 (statements by Chairman Robert 
Pitofsky, and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek, III, and Christine A. 
Varney) (1997) (last accessed, April 24, 2003, http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/04/others.htm). 
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research.185 In addition, there was direct competition between the two 
companies with respect to specific products.186  
 The FTC was concerned that Novartis, the newly-named 
surviving company, might not adequately license its gene therapy 
intellectual property to assure that other firms would be unable to close 
the R&D gap.187 By not licensing its intellectual property to the other 
research firms, Novartis could have blocked access to the broad future 
gene therapy market. Absent the merger, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz could 
have licensed their patents either for cash or as part of competing 
cooperative development projects.188 The FTC resolved its concerns in 
this important innovation market through a consent order that required 
the licensing of certain technology and patent rights to Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer.189  This licensing arrangement ensures that Rhone-Poulenc will be 
in a position to compete with the merged firm.190  
2. Silicon Graphics 
 In the early-to-mid 1990s, Silicon Graphics controlled 90 percent 
of the market for entertainment graphics workstations.191  It wanted to 
acquire Wavefront and Alias, two of the three dominant developers of 
Unix-based entertainment graphics software that run on those 
workstations.192 
 The FTC was concerned that this would produce a vertical 
foreclosure that would eliminate innovative competition in both markets: 
rival workstation manufacturers would not be able to compete effectively 
if Wavefront and Alias designed their software to be compatible only 
                                                 
185     Id. 
186   See In the Matter of Ciba-Geigy, FTC Docket No. 3275 (complaint) (1997) (discussing corn 
herbicides).  
187    Id, at 9. 
188  See Elyse Tanouye & Robert Langreth, Genetic Giant: Cost of Drug Research is Driving 
Merger Talks of Glaxo, SmithKline, Wall St. J. A1 (Feb. 2, 1998) (discussing Ciba-
Geigy/Sandoz's licensing or gene-therapy technologies and patents). 
189  See John R. Wilke, U.S. Forces New Drug Giant to Share Genetic Research, Wall St. J. B4 
(Dec. 18, 1996) (reporting on FTC's demand that Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz license rivals in 
order to preserve competition and innovation).  
190  Id. 
191  See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 120 F.T.C. 928, 931 (F.T.C. 1995). 
192  Id. at 928-31. 
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with Silicon Graphics Workstations, and rival entertainment graphics 
software developers would be foreclosed from 90 percent of the market if 
Silicon Graphics closed its open software interface so that only 
Wavefront and Alias could design compatible software.193   
 The Commission negotiated a three-part consent order with 
Silicon Graphics.194  To preserve workstation competition, the 
Commission required that the post-acquisition company enter into a 
porting agreement with workstation competitors whereby Silicon 
Graphics would be required to (1) ensure optimal interoperation of 
Alias’s leading software programs with competitors’ workstations; (2) 
construct a firewall to bar the transfer of workstation competitors’ 
proprietary information to Silicon Graphics in order to promote 
competition fairness; and (3) ensure software competition by maintaining 
an open architecture and publishing its application programming 
interfaces in addition to not discriminating against software rivals of 
Alias and Wavefront.195 
C. Acquisition of Intellectual Property through Unilateral Conduct  
 Most case law suggests that the acquisition of valid intellectual 
property by unilateral actions does not raise any significant antitrust 
issue.196  However, Section 2 of the Sherman Act focuses on the purpose 
behind the conduct and has been interpreted in such a manner that even 
the mere acquisition of patents through internal actions can sometimes be 
subject to antitrust attack, especially where the acquisition of the patent is 
part of a broader monopolistic scheme.197  The District Court for the 
District of Connecticut demonstrated an example of this point of view in 
SCM Corporation v. Xerox Corporation : “[O]nce a company had 
acquired monopoly power, it could not thereafter acquire lawful patent 
                                                 
193  Id. at 940-41. 
194  Pitofsky, supra.  
195  Id.  at 554. 
196  See e.g. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950) 
(“The mere accumulation of patents, no matter how many, is not in and of itself illegal.”). 
197  See U.S. v. United Shoe Mfg. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 332 (D. Mass 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 
521 (1954);  U.S. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 214 (D. Del. 1953), 
aff’d, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (“No judge has ever said where an inventor discloses his 
invention in return for the grant by the Government of a 17-year exclusive right to practice 
the same, and, having been awarded the patent, produces the product, he is guilty of 
monopolization.”). 
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power if it obtained new patents on its own inventions primarily for the 
purpose of blocking the development and marketing of competitive 
products rather than primarily to protect its own products from being 
imitated or blocked by others.”198 
VI.  REFUSAL TO LICENSE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
As a general rule, a United States patent does not have to be licensed.199  
This rule conforms to the fundamental principle of antitrust law that 
companies are allowed to unilaterally choose with whom they want to 
conduct business.200   
However, Section 2 of the Sherman Act may prohibit a firm from 
unilaterally refusing to license their intellectual property rights where 
such a refusal would allow the firm to obtain or maintain monopoly 
power by excluding competition in a way that does not benefit 
consumers.201  This proposition has been given a relatively broad 
interpretation by the Ninth Circuit in Image Technical Services,202 and a 
much narrower interpretation by the Federal Circuit in In re Independent 
Service Organizations (Antitrust Litigation).203 
A. Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak Co.  
In Image Technical Services, a group of independent service 
organizations (ISOs) challenged the defendant Eastman Kodak’s practice 
of refusing to sell patented parts for its copiers to ISOs servicing its 
                                                 
198  463 F. Supp. 983, 1007 (D. Conn. 1978), certifying question to, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 
1981). 
199  Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908); 35 U.S.C. § 
271(d)(4).  The same rule generally applies to copyright. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. 
Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (“author’s desire to exclude others from 
use of its copyright work is a presumptively valid business justification.”).  See also, 
Antitrust Law Developments (5th ed. 2002) p. 1075. 
200  U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
201     Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n 29 (1992).  The court 
stated that a patent holder could refuse to license, but such refusal was subject to a rebuttal 
presumption that refusing to license was harmful to consumers. 
202  Image Technical Serv., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997) 
[hereinafter Kodak II]. 
203  CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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copiers and micrographic equipment. 204  The ISOs claimed that Kodak 
leveraged “its monopoly over Kodak parts to gain or attempt to gain a 
monopoly over the service of Kodak equipment,”205 thus violating the 
prohibition against monopolization in Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  The 
jury awarded a $71.8 million verdict to the plaintiffs.206  The Ninth Circuit 
upheld the verdict on appeal.207  The appellate court stated that 
“‘exploiting [a] dominant position in one market to expand [the] empire 
into the next’ is broad enough to cover monopoly leveraging under 
[Section] 2.”208 
The court also stated that a monopolist is presumed to have a valid 
business justification in refusing to license: the “‘desire to exclude others 
from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid business justification 
for any immediate harm to consumers.'”209  However, the court went on to 
qualify this general proposition, adding that “[n]either the aims of 
intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a 
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask 
anticompetitive conduct.”210  Thus, the presumption of a valid business 
justification may be rebutted by evidence of pretext; this can be shown 
by evidence of the monopolist’s state of mind or subjective 
motivations.211  In this case, the Ninth Circuit found it more likely than 
not a jury would have found that Kodak was motivated by pretext, as 
opposed to the genuine desire to protect its intellectual property rights.212 
B. FTC v. Intel213 
One case consistent with Image Technical Services is the FTC’s 
challenge to Intel’s refusal to provide customers with technical 
                                                 
204  This group included Image Technical Services and ten others.  Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1195. 
205  Id. at 1208. 
206  Id. at 1195. 
207  Id. at 1207. 
208  Id. at 1216 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 
n. 28 (1992) [hereinafter Kodak I]). 
209  Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Data Gen.,, 36 F.3d at 1187). 
210  Id. at 1219 (citing Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 484). 
211  Id. 
212  Id. at 1219-20. 
213  In the Matter of Intel Corp., 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 145 (F.T.C. Aug. 3, 1999) (Dkt. No. 9288). 
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information relating to its microprocessor technology.214  Intel was 
considered a monopolist in the microprocessor industry, with over 80 
percent of the market share.215  Intel traditionally had promoted its 
microprocessors by providing customers with proprietary technical 
information in advance of the official release of a new product, thereby 
enabling use of the processors in new computers more readily.216  The 
FTC alleged that on a number of occasions, Intel ceased sharing this 
information with customers that were seeking to protect their intellectual 
property rights against Intel, an action which reduced innovation and 
harmed customers.217 
The case was eventually settled with a consent decree.218   As part of the 
consent decree, Intel agreed not to withhold the information from a 
customer because of an intellectual property dispute with that customer.219  
This settlement supported the proposition that a monopolist may not use 
its monopoly power to coerce or intimidate rivals to give up their 
intellectual property rights without a legitimate business justification. 
C. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.220 
This case stemmed from the same set of facts as the FTC’s Intel 
challenge.  Intergraph made the argument that the proprietary technology 
and chips that Intel had been supplying to it were “essential facilities,” 
without which it could not do business, and Intel’s decision to withhold 
the technology and chips in retaliation for Intergraph’s refusal to license 
its patents violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 221  
The district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of 
Intergraph,222 but the preliminary injunction was vacated on appeal by the 
                                                 
214  See generally David Balto, Protecting Competition from the Abuse of Monopoly Power: The 
Intel Case, 16 The Computer Law.  4, 4-10 (June/July 1999). 
215  Id. 
216  Id. 
217  Intel, 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 145, at *3. 
218     In the Matter of Intel Corp., FTC Decision and Order (August 6, 1999) (Docket No. 9288) 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/intel.do.htm 
219  Id.  
220  195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
221  Id. at 1356-59. 
222   Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1259 (N.D. Ala. 1998). 
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Federal Circuit.223  The Federal Circuit stated that the essential facilities 
doctrine required both the facility owner (Intel) and the facility user 
(Intergraph) to compete in a downstream market that required access to 
the essential facility.224  In that case, the court held that the two companies 
did not compete in the downstream market, and therefore there could be 
no antitrust violation.225  The court did not rule out finding essential 
facility doctrine to be applicable to intellectual property rights in the 
appropriate situation, however.226 
The Federal Circuit also rejected the charge that Intel was guilty of 
improperly tying its continued supply of technical information to 
Intergraph’s relinquishment of its patents.227  The court held that, "Intel 
did not demand that Intergraph buy its products, and the record describes 
no market in which Intel's licensing proposals were shown to have 
distorted competition.”228 
D. In re Independent Service Organizations (Antitrust Litigation) 
In In re Independent Service Organizations (Antitrust Litigation), the  
Federal Circuit took a different approach from the Ninth Circuit in Image 
Technical Services.  At issue was Xerox’s refusal to sell certain parts of 
its copiers to  ISOs that were not also end users of Xerox products.229  
Xerox’s policy forced CSU, an ISO, to purchase used parts from other 
ISOs and from its customers.   CSU sued Xerox, alleging that its policies 
were intended to drive ISOs from a relevant market of service and repair 
of Xerox copiers.230  In affirming the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Xerox, the Federal Circuit held that: 
In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and 
Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce the 
statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed 
invention free from liability under the antitrust laws.  We therefore will not 
inquire into his subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even 
though his refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an 
                                                 
223  Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1349. 
224  Id. at 1357. 
225  Id. at 1357-58. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. at 1361-62. 
228  Id. at 1361. 
229  CSU, 203 F.3d at 1324 
230  Id. 
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anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally 
extended beyond the statutory patent grant.231   
Thus, at least in the Federal Circuit, a monopolist’s mere refusal to 
license will be upheld, except in very limited circumstances.  Moreover, 
the subjective motivation of the patentee is irrelevant—an approach 
contrary to that taken in Image Technical Services.  The broader 
approach espoused in In re Independent Service Organizations (Antitrust 
Litigation) has since been criticized.232  Former FTC Chairman Pitofsky 
has stated that it is an undue expansion of the intellectual property 
grant.233   Furthermore, in an amicus curiae brief filed before the Supreme 
Court on the request for certiorari, the DOJ stated it would have “serious 
concerns” were the Federal Circuit to hold a refusal to license could only 
be an antitrust violation in such limited circumstances.234  However, other 
commentators agree with the Federal Circuit and view the Image 
Technical Services decision as relying too much on principles of antitrust 
law as opposed to intellectual property law.235 
E. Refusal to Deal as Part of a Broader Non-Compete Agreement 
1. United States v. General Electric 
                                                 
231  Id. at 1327-28.  In a related case, the district court went further, stating that “where a patent 
has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws cannot 
give rise to liability under the antitrust laws” and that “[a] patentee may unilaterally exclude 
others from using its invention even if such conduct allows the patentee to obtain 
monopolies in multiple markets.” In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 
1070, 1088-89 (D. Kan. 2000). 
232  See R. Hewitt Pate, Speech, Antitrust and Intellectual Policy (Am. Intell. Prop. L. Assn., Jan. 
24, 2003) (available at <www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200701.htm>) (accessed Apr. 
17, 2003); A. Douglas Melamed & Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, Presentation at FTC/DOJ 
Hearings on Competition & Intellectual Prop. Law & Policy in the Knowledge Based Econ., 
The CSU Case: Facts, Formalism and the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property 
Law  (F.T.C. May 1, 2002), in 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 407 (2002) (claiming that refusals to 
deal should not be treated any differently when they involve intellectual property then when 
they involve other types of property). 
233  Pitofsky, supra. 
234  Br. of Amicus Curiae U.S. at 11-12, CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 531 U.S. 1143 (2002) (No. 
00-62).   
235  See e.g Michael H. Kauffman, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.: Taking 
One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights and 
Antitrust Liability, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 471 (1999). 
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Where a refusal to deal is part of a broader non-compete arrangement, it 
may be open to challenge.  United States v. General Electric Company 
(GE) involved the licensing of diagnostic materials developed by GE to 
help service GE medical imaging equipment more efficiently.236  GE 
made licenses available to hospital purchasers of GE imaging machines 
under GE's most sophisticated diagnosis materials but conditioned the 
grant of a license on the licensee refraining from competing with GE in 
the repair of imaging equipment owned by third parties.237 
The DOJ alleged that GE had violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act by refusing to deal with potential competitors in the imaging 
equipment repair market.238 The district court denied GE’s motion to 
dismiss with respect to the Section 1 claims, but granted the motion with 
respect to the government’s Section 2 claim.239   
A settlement and consent decree was eventually reached, which 
prohibited GE from entering into any agreement whereby the end user is 
prohibited from providing third party service.240  However, the 
Competitive Impact Statement provides that the “[j]udgment does not 
prohibit GE from refusing to license its advanced service materials to 
independent service organizations or to any other person who is not an 
end-user of GE medical equipment.”241  The consent agreement also 
allowed GE to implement security procedures aimed at preventing the 
unauthorized use of its intellectual property by limiting its software to the 
particular GE machine covered by the relevant licensing agreement.242 
VII.  LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The licensing of intellectual property rights often has a strong 
procompetitive rationale, but may also have anticompetitive 
                                                 
236  U.S. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,765 (D. Mont. 1997) (denial of GE’s 
motion to dismiss alleged violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act) [hereinafter GE 1997];  
U.S. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,399 (D. Mont. 1999) (final judgment) 
[hereinafter GE 1999].  
237  GE 1999, 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,399 at **3-4. 
238  GE 1997, 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,765 at **1-2. 
239  Id. at *13. 
240  GE 1999, 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,399 at ** 4-5. 
241  In the Matter of General Electric Co., Department of Justice, Competitive Impact Statement 
¶ III (B) (July 14, 1998) (last accessed April 24, 2003, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ft800/1842.htm). 
242  Id. at *5-6. 
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consequences.  In addition to granting the right to use intellectual 
property, licenses typically include some type of restriction on the use of 
the property.  This section first outlines the pro and anticompetitive 
effects of patent licensing and then takes a closer look at how the courts 
have treated several restrictions that are sometimes present in licensing 
agreements.  
A. Procompetitive Justification for Licensing Agreements  
A license under a patent involves, in effect, a grant of immunity from an 
infringement suit.  Such a grant of immunity can yield procompetitive 
benefits. 
First, the grant of a license provides the recipient with the option to use a 
technology that it otherwise could not use.  Access to the technology can 
yield production efficiencies, increased output, and lower prices.  
Moreover, access to the technology may produce synergies in that the 
recipient of the immunity may be in a unique position to improve or 
expand the patented invention and thereby bring new products and 
additional choices to consumers. 
Second, licensing also permits the patent owner to increase its financial 
reward from investing in the patent.  Sometimes the owner of a patented 
technology will not be in the best position to commercialize the patent in 
all possible fields of use.  Licensing permits the patent owner to choose 
the most efficient means for commercialization of the patent.  Such 
exploitation in turn increases the perceived value of patents and hence 
increases the incentives to invest in the development of new 
technologies.  Indeed, the Licensing Guidelines provide that: “[t]he 
owner of intellectual property has to arrange for [the intellectual 
property’s] combination with other necessary factors to realize its 
commercial value.  Often, the owner finds it most efficient to contract 
with others for these factors, to sell rights to the intellectual property, or 
to enter into a joint venture arrangement for its development, rather than 
supplying these complementary factors itself.”243   
B. Anticompetitive Effects of Licensing Agreements 
Licensing agreements can be anticompetitive in two ways.244  
Occasionally, a license can be a “mere sham to disguise a naked, 
                                                 
243  Licensing Guidelines, supra. 
244  See Hovenkamp, supra. 
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anticompetitive activity”.245  More often, a licensing arrangement can 
provide some social benefits as described in the previous section, but 
might also pose a threat of economic harm by foreclosing competition in 
a market where a less restrictive alternative is available. 
Licensing agreements with certain restrictive terms were dealt with very 
strictly by the agencies and courts for many years.  This treatment was 
outlined in a 1970 speech which described the now infamous “nine no-
nos.”246  The nine no-nos are discounted as overly restrictive today and no 
longer represent the law or the position of the agencies.247  
C. Analysis of Licensing Restrictions 
In general, the methods of analyzing the competitive nature of particular 
licensing clauses are not so distinctive from the methods of analyzing 
other potentially anticompetitive contract clauses that do not involve 
intellectual property rights.  However, intellectual property rights can 
make the analysis of agreements between competitors or potential 
competitors more complex, because it is often difficult to tell whether 
two intellectual property owners are horizontal competitors, vertical 
competitors, or not in competition at all.  Also, because of the peculiar 
nature of intellectual property rights as a type of legalized monopoly, 
agreements between competitors are important means of exploiting 
intellectual property and are vital to the economy.  Licensing restrictions 
generally are efficient to the extent that they facilitate such agreements. 
While in recent years the antitrust authorities and the courts have been 
relatively sympathetic to intellectual property licensing arrangements, 
they have rejected arguments that there should be broad immunity.  For 
example, in the D.C. Circuit decision in United States v. Microsoft, 
                                                 
245  Id. 
246 The following provisions comprised the nine no-nos; that is, licensing provisions that were 
considered per se illegal by the FTC: (1) Tying of unpatented supplies; (2) Mandatory 
grantbacks; (3) Post-sale restrictions on resale by purchasers of patented products; (4) Tie-
outs; (5) Licensee veto power over the licenser's grant of further licenses; (6) Mandatory 
package licensing; (7) Compulsory payment of royalties in amounts not reasonably related to 
sales of the Patented product; (8) restrictions on sales of unpatented products made by a 
patented Process; and (9) Specifying prices licensee could charge upon resale of licensed 
products.  See Bruce B. Wilson, Address, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field 
of Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions (New Eng. Antitrust Conf., Nov. 6, 
1970).  
247    Willard K. Tom and Joshua A. Newberg, “Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From 
Separate Spheres to Unified Field,” 66 Antitrust L.J. 167, 175-82 (1997) 
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Corp.,248 the court summarily rejected Microsoft’s argument that 
intellectual property licenses enjoyed antitrust immunity:  
Microsoft's primary copyright argument borders upon the frivolous. The 
company claims an absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual 
property as it wishes: "If intellectual property rights have been lawfully 
acquired," it says, then "their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust 
liability." Appellant's Opening Br. at 105. That is no more correct than the 
proposition that use of one's personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot 
give rise to tort liability. As the Federal Circuit succinctly stated: "Intellectual 
property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws." In re 
Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).249 
Often the legality of a licensing agreement will depend on the 
competitive relationship of the relevant firms.  According to Section 1 
jurisprudence, agreements between horizontal competitors or potential 
competitors are viewed much more harshly than agreements between 
non-competitors because of the fear of cartels.250  Under the Licensing 
Guidelines, “[a] firm will be treated as a likely potential competitor if 
there is evidence that entry by that firm is reasonably probable in the 
absence of the licensing arrangement.”251  However, this counter-factual 
determination often involves extremely difficult judgment calls. 
Agreements between non-competitors can also run foul of the antitrust 
laws in a number of ways.  In general, a provision in a license to a non-
competitor will run afoul of Section 1 if it unreasonably forecloses 
competitors of either party to the agreement from competing on the 
merits and does not offer likely or actual benefits to consumers that 
would outweigh the likely or actual anticompetitive effects. 
One particular area of patent law that should be considered in the 
antitrust analysis of licensing restrictions is the exhaustion doctrine.  This 
doctrine states that: “[T]he patent owner’s authority under the patent laws 
                                                 
248  253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see Atari Games, 897 F.2d at 1576 (“[A] patent owner may 
not take the property right granted by a patent and use it to extend his power in the 
marketplace improperly, i.e. beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the 
patent laws.  The fact that a patent is obtained does not wholly insulate the patent owner 
from the antitrust laws.”). 
249  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 63. 
250    See Seth Schiesel, New Economy, Bringing Competition Policy into the Age of the Internet, 
The New York Times, December 25, 2000 (quoting then-acting assistant attorney general for 
antitrust A. Douglas Melamed: "There is no question that horizontal problems are easier to 
understand and are more likely to trigger law enforcement than vertical arrangements.  Antitrust 
law is now, and I think quite appropriately, focused on identifying where there might exist a 
particular competition problem in the sense of the creation of economic power in certain 
markets.”) 
251  Licensing Guidelines, supra.  
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to control the manufacture, use and sale of the patented product is 
‘exhausted’ by the first sale of the product by someone authorized to 
make sales.”252  Therefore, if a licensee wants to resell or re-license a 
patent, the contract terms will be governed by standard antitrust law, 
without the protections that are peculiar to intellectual property rights.253     
D. Requirement of the Payment of Royalties  
Because patentees have the right to exclude others from manufacturing or 
using a patented invention, a patentee's decision to license a patent, but 
only at a very high royalty, does not ordinarily raise any antitrust 
scrutiny.    
Some courts have looked with suspicion at licensors who license their 
patents at different royalties to different licensees.254  These cases have 
been widely criticized, however, because if a patentee has the right to 
refuse altogether to grant a license to a second licensee, the decision to 
grant a license—but at a higher rate than charged to the first licensee—
should not, absent more, create any competitive concern.255   
Royalty requirements become problematic when they are seen as 
expanding the patent grant in some way.  For example, in Brulotte v. 
Thys Company, the Supreme Court held that an obligation in a patent 
license to pay royalties extending beyond the patent term was per se 
illegal. 256   In that case, the Court appeared to be referring to notions of 
patent misuse and does not declare such a license illegal under the 
antitrust laws.257  It is far from apparent that such a restriction in a license 
would tend to present competitive problems that would constitute an 
antitrust violation.258  
                                                 
252  Holmes, supra. 
253  See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
254  See e.g. Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F.Supp. 9 (D. Alaska 1965); LaPeyre v. Fed. 
Trade Commn., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966). 
255    ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 1, 1060 (Debra J. Pearlstein ed., 
5th ed., ABA 2002) 
256  Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964); see Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 169 F. 
Supp. 2d 328, 331 (D. Del 2001) (“Arrangement in which a patentee effectively extends the 
terms of its patent by requiring post-expiration royalties constitutes per se patent misuse.”). 
257  Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 34. 
258  Judge Posner recently criticized the Brulotte rule as containing dubious reasoning and being 
out of touch with the Supreme Court’s current thinking, while noting that he has no authority 
to overrule a Supreme Court precedent. Scheiber v. Dolby Laboratories, Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 
456                         IDEA –The Journal of Law and Technology 
43 IDEA 413 (2003) 
Royalties based on sales of products which do not use the patent have 
been found unlawful, but royalties may be measured by sales of products 
not based on the patent where “convenience of the parties rather than 
patent power dictates.”259  Differential royalties are not subject to the 
Robinson-Patman Act (which bans price discrimination) if no goods are 
sold with the license.260   
E. Territorial Restrictions  
35 U.S.C. § 261 expressly permits the exclusive licensing of a United 
States patent “to the whole or any specified part of the United States.”261  
The Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit have both held that restrictions on 
exportation of a patented product are also acceptable in licensing 
agreements.262 
On occasion, territorial restrictions in licenses have been struck down 
where the licensing agreements itself was seen by the courts as a sham or 
pretext for implementing a market division scheme between 
competitors.263  Territorial restrictions have also been struck down where 
there are several licensees, and the restrictions are seen as being 
requested by the licensees themselves as a way to avoid competition with 
each other.264 
                                                                                                                       
1017-18 (7th Cir. 2002). (cert denied, Jan 13, 2003). According to Posner, “charging 
royalties beyond the term of the patent does not lengthen the patentee’s monopoly; it merely 
alters the timing of royalty payments.” Id. at 1018; see Harold See & Frank M. Caprio, The 
Trouble with Brulotte: the Patent Royalty Term and Patent Monopoly Extension, 1990 Utah 
L. Rev. 813 (1990).  
259  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 
260  La Salle St. Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 
1968), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 445 F. 2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971). 
261  35 U.S.C. § 261. 
262  Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1954); Atari Games, 897 
F.2d at 1578 . 
263  See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1951); Licensing Guidelines, 
supra, Example 7; ABA, Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 2, 1065 (Debra 
J. Pearlstein 5th ed. ABA 2002). 
264  See Intl. Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 792 F.2d 416, 429 (4th Cir. 1986); ABA, 
Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments vol. 2, 1065 (Debra J. Pearlstrin 5th ed. ABA 
2002). 
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The general freedom to impose territorial restrictions is somewhat limited 
by the exhaustion doctrine, which provides that the patent right is 
exhausted by the first sale of the patented product.265  
F. Field of Use Restrictions 
A “field of use restriction” is a restriction in a license that limits the 
licensee's use of the patented invention to one or more specified fields.  
In General Talking Pictures Corporation v. Western Electric Company, 
the Supreme Court held such a limitation enforceable.266  In United Sates 
v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the patent owner’s right to shut out all competition included the lesser 
right to restrict the license’s field of use. 267 
Field of use restrictions imposed on a purchaser from the patent holder 
are valid so long as they do not in some way go beyond the scope of the 
patent grant,268 for example by imposing restrictions upon product use 
after they are sold,269 in which case they will be analyzed under the rule of 
reason.  
G. Price Restrictions 
Price restrictions are licensing provisions that in some way restrict the 
price at which the patented article is sold.  There is considerable 
uncertainty regarding the circumstances when price restrictions will be 
considered antitrust violations.270 
General Electric 
                                                 
265  See e.g. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873); U.S. v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
266  Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938). 
267  U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532, 541 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d 648 F.2d 
642 (9th Cir. 1981). 
268  See e.g. Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
269  This would violate the exhaustion doctrine. See U.S. v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 
1118, 1147 (D.N.J. 1976).  
270  See Holmes, supra, § 16.01. 
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In United States v. General Electric Co.,271 the Supreme Court concluded 
that a provision in a single license setting the price at which the 
manufacturer can sell the patented product “is reasonably within the 
reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure.” 
272  The Court observed that “[i]t would seem entirely reasonable that [a 
patentee] should say to the licensee, ‘Yes, you may make and sell articles 
under my patent, but not so as to destroy the profit that I wish to obtain 
by making them and selling them myself.’”273     
  The Supreme Court’s ruling in General Electric is limited to price 
fixing for the patented product itself.274  Price fixing of non-patented 
items, even when produced by patented machines or processes, remains 
per se unlawful.  In the past, the Department of Justice has attacked 
General Electric and sought to have the decision overruled.275  Twice, the 
Supreme Court has upheld the case.276  
 While General Electric has not been overruled, it has been 
limited by a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court held certain 
licensing schemes that included price restrictions were illegal.277   
 It should be noted that General Electric provides no protection 
where a licensing arrangement is shown to have the true purpose of 
fixing prices among competitors, with the exploitation of patents being 
merely incidental to this purpose.  This would constitute horizontal price 
fixing and be considered per se illegal.278 
H. Quantity Restrictions 
                                                 
271  272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926). 
272  Id. at 489. 
273  Id. at 490. 
274  Id. at 493. 
275  See U.S. v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965); U.S. v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 
291-304 (1948). 
276  Id. 
277  See e.g. U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948) (It is unlawful for a patentee 
“[to] ac[t] in concert with all members of an industry, to issue substantially identical licenses 
to all members of the industry under the terms of which the industry is completely 
regimented”.); Line Material, 333 U.S. at 303 (cross licenses with price fixing provisions); 
Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283, 292 (3rd Cir. 1956); United 
States v. Vehicular Parking, 54 F. Supp. 828, 834, modified, 56 F. Supp. 297 (D. Del. 1944), 
modified, 61 F. Supp. 656 (D. Del. 1945).  
278  See U.S. v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 377 (1952). 
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Few decisions have addressed quantity restrictions.279  However, the 
courts have generally held that provisions in patent licenses that restrict 
the quantity of patented articles produced by the licenser are lawful.280 
There is a split of authority as to whether the patent grant protects a 
patentee who includes a provision in a patent license that limits the 
quantity of unpatented products produced by the patented apparatus.281    
I. Grantback Clauses 
A grantback clause in a patent license typically requires the licensee to 
grant back to the licensor patent rights which the licensee may later 
develop related to the subject matter of the licensed patent.  Grantback 
requirements can be exclusive (requiring the licensee to assign future 
patents to the licensor) or nonexclusive (requiring only the grant back of 
a license).   
Grantbacks have a number of procompetitive justifications, including (1) 
risk sharing between a licensee and licensor, (2) incentives for licensor to 
continue research in an area, (3) stimulating first-generation innovation, 
and (4) encouraging the licensing of first-generation innovation.282 
On the other hand, grantback provisions potentially can have a negative 
competitive effect, inter alia, by:  (1) discouraging the licensee from 
engaging in competitive research and development, (2) permitting the 
licensor to acquire or maintain monopoly power, or (3) facilitating cartel 
behavior in a market. 283 
In Transparent-Wrap Machine Corporation v. Stokes & Smith 
Company,284 the Supreme Court concluded that a grantback provision 
which required the licensee to assign back to the licensor any patents on 
improvements of the licensed patented invention was not per se illegal.285  
                                                 
279  Holmes, supra, § 19.01, at 19-1.   
280  See e.g. Atari Games, 897 F.2d 1572; E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 118 F. Supp. 41[]; U.S. v. 
Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1945). 
281  Compare Am. Equip. Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 1934), 
with Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 109 F. Supp 657, 660 (D.N.J. 1951), modified, 207 
F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1953). 
282  See Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 5.6. 
283  Id.; see e.g. U.S. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949). 
284  329 U.S. 637 (1947). 
285  Id. at 648. 
460                         IDEA –The Journal of Law and Technology 
43 IDEA 413 (2003) 
But the Court stressed that under appropriate circumstances a grantback 
provision could have a purpose or effect violative of the antitrust laws.286   
Generally, the agencies and courts apply the rule of reason in their 
analysis of grantback provisions.287  Some of the factors that are 
considered include whether the grantback is exclusive or not (and if it is, 
whether the licensee has the right to use improvements), whether the 
grantback is royalty free, whether the parties are competitors, the market 
power of the parties, the policy of the grantback regarding sublicenses, 
whether the grantback is limited in scope to the licensed patent, the 
duration of the grantback, and the effect of the grantback on the incentive 
for developmental research.288 
J. Tying Arrangements 
A “tie-in” is a commercial arrangement in which the seller of one product 
(the tying product) conditions the sale of the product on the buyer 
purchasing a second product (the tied product) from a seller or a 
designated third party.289  A classic tie-in involving a patent license 
occurred in International Salt Company v. United States,290 where a patent 
owner licensed a patent covering salt making machinery (the tying 
product) on the condition that the licensee purchase unpatented salt (the 
tied product) from the licensor. 291  The Supreme Court unanimously 
found this to be illegal.292 
Tying arrangements potentially run afoul of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act or Section 3 of the Clayton Act.  The potential competitive problem 
with a tie-in has been described as the seller using market power in one 
market to diminish competition in another market.293  “The [Supreme] 
                                                 
286    Id. at 646.   
287  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 5.6. 
288  ABA, Antitrust Section, 2 Antitrust Law Developments, vol. 2 1038 (Debra J. Pearlstein 5th 
ed. ABA 2002). 
289  Id. at 1067 
290  332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
291  Id. at 393-94 . 
292  Id. at 395-96. 
293  See, e.g., Daniel Rubinfeld, Speech, Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust Enforcement in 
Dynamic Network Industries, (Software Publisher´s Association Spring Symposium, Mar. 
24, 1998) (available at <www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1611.htm>) (accessed Mar. 7, 
2003) (“Suppose, for example, that a dominant firm has a product with a current technology 
that is supported legally by its intellectual property rights. Suppose further that the firm 
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Court has held many times that power gained through some natural and 
legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give 
rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to 
expand his empire into the next.’”294   
There are a variety of potential licensing arrangements that do not 
involve a classic tie-in but which present similar economic issues.  For 
example, licensing arrangements where the licensor (a) charges higher 
royalties to licensees who do not purchase unpatented products from the 
licensor than he or she charges to licensees who do, (b) threatens to 
discontinue purchases from a potential licensor unless the licensee agrees 
to a license, (c) requires the licensee not to compete in the sale of a 
related but unpatented product (tie-out), and (d) licenses a group of 
patents as a package.295 
With respect to package licensing, when the license is offered only for 
the patents as a group and not for the individual patents, the license is 
referred to as a mandatory package license.296  In Zenith Radio 
Corporation v. Hazeltime Research, Incorporated,297 the Supreme Court 
found one particular mandatory package license to constitute a per se 
antitrust violation where the licensor refused to license the technology 
separately.  
While some courts have characterized tying as per se illegal, the 
prohibition on tying has not been employed woodenly.298  The courts have 
                                                                                                                       
offers to license its technology only to those firms that agree to also license that firm's 
complementary product, and suppose that the complementary product builds on the firm's 
next generation technology. Such a tying arrangement could allow the dominant firm to 
create a new installed base of users of its next generation technology in a manner that would 
effectively foreclose the opportunities of competing firms to offer their products in the battle 
for the next generation technology.”).  
294  Kodak I., 504 U.S. at 479, n.29 (quoting Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594, 611 
(1953)). 
295  See generally, ABA, Antitrust Section, 2 Antitrust Law Developments, vol. 2 175-206 (Debra 
J. Pearlstein 5th ed. ABA 2002) 
296  R. Hewitt Pate, “Antitrust and Intellectual Property,” (address),) p. 7 (January 24, 2003)  
(http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200701.pdf) 
297  395 U.S. 100.  However, a package license that is voluntarily entered into as a matter of 
mutual convenience has been held to be lawful.  Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 829-30; see 
W. Elec. Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 631 F.2d 333, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1980).   
298  See, e.g., Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).  In a later case, the 
three elements of a per se antitrust tying claim are "(1) a tie-in between two products or 
services sold in different markets, (2) market power in the tying product, and (3) the tying 
arrangement affects a not insubstantial volume of commerce" Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1995).   
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looked to potential economic justifications for such an arrangement 
before finding any antitrust violation.299  In fact, an argument can be made 
that in certain cases, tying can function in a procompetitive manner.300  
According to the Licensing Guidelines, the antitrust agencies will use a 
type of rule of reason analysis, and would be likely to challenge a tying 
agreement where “(1) the seller has market power in the tying product, 
(2) the arrangement has an adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
market for the tied product, and (3) efficiency justifications for the 
arrangement do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects.”301 
According to the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft, there are four elements to a 
per se tying violation: “(1) the tying and tied goods are two separate 
products; (2) the defendant has market power in the tying product 
market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no choice but to purchase 
the tied product from it; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a 
substantial volume of commerce.”302  “Market power is the power ‘to 
force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive 
market.’”303  Crucial to the antitrust inquiry is whether one or two distinct 
products are involved.304  
Older cases have tended to presume the existence of market power in the 
tying product where the tying product is a patent or copyright.305  This 
presumption has been undermined in recent lower court decisions and by 
amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), which requires a showing of actual 
market power where a tying arrangement is being evaluated as a possible 
patent misuse.306  The Licensing Guidelines specify that the antitrust 
                                                 
299  See e.g. U.S. v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d, 365 U.S. 567 
(1961); Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); Dehydrating Process Co. v. 
A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961). 
300  See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 355-81 (Basic Books, Inc. 1978). 
301  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 5.3 (footnotes omitted). 
302   253 F.3d at 85 (citing Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 461-62; Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984)). 
303  Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 464 (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14, n. 9).  
304  Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19. 
305  See e.g. White Motor Co. v. U.S., 372 U.S. 253, 259 (1963); U.S. v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 
45 (1962); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9, n.10; Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 
F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984). 
306  In relevant part 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (The Patent Misuse Reform Act) states: “No patent 
owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent 
shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by 
reason of his having done one or more of the following … (5) conditioned the license of any 
rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights 
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agencies will not presume that intellectual property rights confer market 
power.307 
In high-tech cases, the issue is often whether the arrangement involves 
two separate products that can be tied together.  In the Microsoft case, the 
issue was whether Windows and Internet Explorer were two separate 
products and whether Microsoft’s integration of Internet Explorer into 
Windows was an illegal tie.308  The D.C. Circuit refused to apply a static 
test of whether there was a separate demand for the two products, as had 
been developed in Jefferson Parish.309  The court believed this test would 
overly punish the first party who integrated at a point where there was 
still separate demand.310  Moreover, the court held that the per se rule was 
not appropriate, at least with respect to platform software tied to 
applications and remanded the issue to the district court for consideration 
under the rule of reason.311  The court noted that the government had 
failed to provide a definition of the browser market and barriers to entry 
and would therefore on remand be precluded from arguing any theory of 
harm that depended on precise definitions of browsers or barriers to 
entry312 other than what may be implicit in Microsoft's tying 
arrangement.313 
The D.C. Circuit laid down the following test for tying on remand.  First, 
the plaintiffs must show that Microsoft's conduct “unreasonably 
restrained competition.”314  Then, if Microsoft offers a procompetitive 
justification, it is the plaintiff’s duty to show that the harms to 
competition outweigh the benefits.315  Finally, the district court must 
consider price bundling.316  If Microsoft price bundled by charging more 
for Windows and Internet Explorer than for Windows alone, then the 
                                                                                                                       
in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the 
patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on 
which the license or sale is conditioned.” 
307  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 5.3. 
308  253 F.3d at 84-95. 
309  466 U.S. at 12-19 (1984). 
310  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 89. 
311  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 89-95 
312  For example, network effects from Internet protocols or extensions embedded in a browser. 
313  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 95 
314  Id. 
315  Id. 
316  Id. at 96. 
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plaintiffs must demonstrate that the anticompetitive effects of Microsoft's 
price bundling outweigh any procompetitive justifications the company 
provides for it.317 
VIII.  PATENT POOLS 
A. Introduction 
The term “pool” has been used to describe myriad different arrangements 
in which patent owners in some manner have combined their patents.318  
The structure of these pooling arrangements have varied dramatically, 
ranging from the cross-licensing of closely-related patents by two patent 
owners to the creation of giant patent holding companies to which many 
pool members assign patents covering disparate technologies.319  All 
pools, however, have one common characteristic:  two or more patent 
owners mutually agree to waive exclusive rights under their respective 
patents so as to grant each other rights and/or to jointly grant rights to 
others under their respective patents.  The essence of a patent pool 
therefore is this mutual agreement among patent owners to waive their 
respective exclusive patent rights. 
According to recent DOJ Business Review Letters, it appears that the 
most important issue involved in analyzing patent pools for possible 
anticompetitive effect is the degree of complementarity of the patents to 
each other.320  The inclusion of complementary patents in a patent pool is 
generally seen as desirable, while the assembly of substitute or rival 
                                                 
317  Id. 
318  Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Joen Klein defined patent pools as “the 
aggregation of intellectual property rights which are the subject of cross-licensing, whether they 
are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through some medium, such as a joint venture, 
set up specifically to administer the patent pool.” He also noted that United States v. Line 
Materials, 333 U.S. 287, 313 n.24 (1948) states that the term “patent pool” is not a term of art.  
Joel Klein, Speech, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law (Am. Intell. Prop. L. Assn., May 2, 1997) 
(available at <www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm>) (accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
319  See Line Material, 333 U.S. at 305; Hartford-Empire Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 386, 395 (1945). 
320 See e.g. Letter from Joel I. Klein to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., DVD Business Review Letter #2 
(June 10, 1999) (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm ; Letter from Joel I. Klein 
to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., DVD Business Review Letter #1(December 16, 1998) 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm; Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard [sic] R. 
Beeney, Esq., MPEG-2 Business Review Letter (June 26, 1997 ) 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.htm. 
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patents in a pool can be anticomptetitive and lead to elevated license 
fees.321  
B. Common Restrictions in Patent Pools 
Seldom are the contractual obligations in a patent pool limited to the 
mutual agreement to grant immunities under patents.  Pools typically 
contain restrictions on those who join a pool by contributing patents 
and/or those who take licenses under the pooled patents. 
One common patent pool restriction is an obligation to pay a fee for the 
grant of immunity under the pooled patents.  However, pooling 
agreements frequently include other types of restrictions on the actions of 
members of the pool and pool licensees.  For example, entry into a pool 
or access to its patents sometimes is limited to those who are willing to 
agree to certain restrictions on how and where the patented inventions 
can be practiced or on the types of products that can be made through use 
of the patents.  Sometimes the restrictions directly regulate the sale of 
products made using the licensed patents, such as restrictions on the 
price, territory of sale, or customers to which the products can be sold.322   
Pools have also differed in the restrictions they place on the contributing 
patent members' ability to license their patents individually outside the 
pool.  Sometimes outside licensing has been precluded, such as by 
requiring an assignment of all rights under the patent.323  Sometimes the 
patent owner has merely been limited in his or her ability to license, such 
as by a requirement that the patent owner receive the consent of other 
pool members.324  Recent DOJ Business Review Letters have placed 
considerable emphasis on allowing the patent owner the freedom to 
license its patent outside the pool.325 
C. Procompetitive Benefits of Patent Pools 
                                                 
321 Id. 
322  See e.g. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287. 
323  See e.g. Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. 386.  
324  See e.g. U.S. v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 201 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff’d, 355 U.S. 5 (1957); 
Mason City Tent & Awning Co. v. Clapper, 144 F. Supp. 754, 759 (W.D. Mo. 1956); but see 
Memorex Corp. v. Intl. Bus. Mach. Corp., 55 F.2d 1379 (1977) (overruling Mason City Tent 
& Awning Co. v. Clapper).   
325 See e.g. DVD Business Review Letter #1, supra; DVD Business Review Letter #2, supra, 
MPEG-2 Business Review Letter, supra. 
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The procompetitive benefits that generally flow from a licensor making 
patented technology available to licensees, as discussed in the previous 
section,326 are also present where multiple licensors make their technology 
available to multiple licensees through a patent pool.  In addition to these 
benefits, patent pools have other unique procompetitive benefits.327 
Patent pools can be a highly efficient way of resolving legal conflicts 
relating to the patents.  Often, it is not possible to use one patent without 
infringing another–the so-called problem of “blocking patents.”328  
When firms work in similar research or manufacturing areas, they 
sometimes become involved in patent conflicts, including mutual patent 
infringement claims or conflicting claims in patent interferences.  It is 
often difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of such legal conflicts.  
The costs associated with resolving these conflicts through litigation can 
often be high.  In addition, there are costs associated with developing a 
product while such disputes are ongoing, because an adverse decision 
may impair the firm's ability to profit from its investment.  To limit all of 
these costs and provide greater predictability, firms involved in patent 
conflicts sometimes resort to some form of pooling of the patents in 
dispute, under which each member has the right to use the patents 
involved.  This solution tends to be highly efficient because the costs 
associated with mutual grants of immunity can be comparatively low.  
The case law is replete with instances where patent pools that were 
formed at least in partial response to such conflicting patent claims are 
upheld.329   
Pooling also can be a highly efficient way for patent owners to respond to 
a demand by a significant number of licensees for access to a large 
number of different patents.  Without a pool, securing such licenses 
would require individual negotiations between numerous patent owners 
and numerous licensees.  This process would involve significant 
transaction costs.  This is especially true where the underlying 
technologies relate to a particular industry standard.  A pool potentially 
                                                 
326  See supra Sec. VII. A. 
327  These benefits were recognized in the Licensing Guidelines, which stated that pools "may 
provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing 
transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation.”  
Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 5.5.   
328    See generally, Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, 
and Standard-Setting, in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds. 2001).  
329  See e.g. Stand. Oil Co. v. U.S., 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931); Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 421; 
Duplan Corp v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 594 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir. 1979).  
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can diminish the number of transactions and lower transaction costs by 
permitting the licensees to negotiate with a single entity that can supply 
access to the desired group of patents.330   
D. Potential Anticompetitive Effects of Patent Pools 
Naked restrictions in patent pools that limit competitive efforts totally 
unrelated to the patents being pooled obviously can produce 
anticompetitive effects.  An example is where a pool among owners of 
patents covering microscopes contains a restriction that obligates the 
fixing of prices in an unrelated market for eyeglasses in which the patent 
owners also compete.  However, even restraints that relate directly to the 
use of the patented inventions can potentially be anticompetitive in other 
ways. 
 For one thing, access could be a concern to the extent that the 
excluded firms cannot compete effectively in the market for the good 
using the licensed technology without belonging to the pool, and the pool 
participants collectively possess market power.331  In addition to access 
restrictions, grantback requirements, obligating members to grant 
licenses to each other for any future products developed using a pool 
license can have an anticompetitive effect, as they could dampen the 
incentive to innovate as a firm would have to share successful research 
and development with other pool members.332  This effect would be 
especially pronounced where the pool is large enough to encompass a 
significant part of a particular innovation market.333  Finally, patent pools 
can have anticompetitive effects when they are used to shield invalid 
patents or when they include patents that are not complementary, and 
would otherwise compete against each other.334 
1. Market for Competitive Technology 
                                                 
330  See e.g. DVD Business Review Letter #1, supra; DVD Business Review Letter #2, supra, 
MPEG-2 Business Review Letter, supra. 
331  Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 5.5. 
332  Id. 
333  Id. 
334  Jeanne Clark et al., Patent Pools:  A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology 
Patents?, 10 (U.S.P.T.O. Dec. 5, 2000) (available at 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf> (accessed Mar. 15, 
2003)). 
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When patents covering technologies that are economic alternatives are 
owned by different entities, then the entities can be viewed as 
competitors in the sale of the technology.  If these entities then pool 
competing patents, the effect could be to diminish competition among the 
patent owners in the licensing of these competing patents.   
When complementary patents are involved,335 the patent owners are not 
horizontal competitors in the offering of patent licenses since the patents 
are not economic substitutes for each other.  The Justice Department has 
indicated that the best way to ensure that the patents in a pool are 
complementary is to limit the pool to essential patents, since essential 
patents are by definition complementary:  
One way to ensure that the proposed Pool will integrate only complementary 
patent rights is to limit the Pool to patents that are essential to compliance 
with the Standard Specifications.  Essential patents by definition have no 
substitutes; one needs licenses to each of them in order to comply with the 
standard.  At the same time, they are complementary to each other; a license 
to one essential patent is more valuable if the licensee also has licenses to use 
other essential patents.336   
Essential patents are clearly those patents that are technically essential 
for compliance with (or the manufacture of) the standard (or product) in 
question, but may also include those patents for which a technically 
viable alternative does not exist.  
2. Foreclosure in Related Markets 
Restrictions in patent pools can potentially impact competition in related 
markets comprising products or services that use the pooled patents as 
inputs.337  For example, if the patents in the pool represent a large 
percentage of the total cost of the product in question, then the pool may 
be used as a means of stabilizing or fixing prices in the market for that 
product.  Additionally, audits of licensees may provide a licensor with 
access to the competitively sensitive information of a licensee.  In these 
situations, firewalls can be erected to limit the flow of competitively 
sensitive information.  Finally, where the licensors represent a significant 
percentage of the sales in a particular market, and where the underlying 
patents are not made available on equal and non-discriminatory terms, 
the pool faces a greater likelihood of challenge. 
                                                 
335  Complementary patents are patents whose value depends on their use together.   
336  DVD Business Review Letter #1, supra; DVD Business Review Letter #2, supra. 
337  See Hovenkamp, supra, § 34.4(b)(3) at 34-24. 
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3. Incentive to Innovate 
Absent a pool, firms have an economic incentive to invest in research and 
development because the discovery of patentable inventions can provide 
them with an advantage over competitors in the marketplace.  However 
this incentive is diminished where a patent pool includes a “grantback” 
provision, requiring the automatic licensing of future improvements in 
the underlying technology.338  This disincentive to innovate can be 
minimized by ensuring that new technologies contributed to the pool are 
weighted more heavily in any determination of royalties, thereby 
increasing the extent to which the innovator is able to capture the full 
value of the innovation in question.  The disincentive is also minimized 
by ensuring that only essential patents are subject to the grantback. 
E. Legal Analysis of Patent Pools 
Patent pools have played an important role in American industry for 
almost 150 years.339  Certain pools have been examined, and sometimes 
challenged, by the antitrust agencies for the past 90 years.340  However, 
there has been frequent flux and uncertainty in the way that the courts 
and agencies have dealt with patent pools over that time period.341  Like 
many licensing arrangements, patent pools were prosecuted relatively 
strictly until fairly recently.  However, since the issuance of the 
Licensing guidelines, there have not been many court cases involving 
patent pools.  Most of the guidance relevant for current business practices 
must therefore come from three business review letters issued by the 
Justice Department.342 
                                                 
338  See e.g. U.S. v. Mfrs. Aircraft Assn., Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,810 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975); U.S. v. Automobile Mfrs. Assn., Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,907 (C.D. Cal. 
1969). 
339  In 1856, the Sewing Machine Combination formed one of the first patent pools consisting of 
sewing machine patents. See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property 
Transactions:  The Case for Patent Pools, 17-18 (August 1999) (available at 
<www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges> (accessed Mar. 15, 2003)). 
340  See e.g. Stand. Sanitary Mfg. v. U.S., 226 U.S. 20 (1912); Stand. Oil, 283 U.S. 163; 
Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. 386. 
341  See generally Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 Yale J. on Reg. 
359, 373-76 (1999). 
342  See DVD Business Review Letter #1, supra, DVD Business Review Letter #2, supra, MPEG-
2 Business Review Letter, supra.  In these letters, the DOJ approved the proposed pools.  See 
generally Clark, supra at 7.  
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In the MPEG-2 Review letter, the Justice Department approved a patent 
pool involving nine large companies and twenty-seven patents that were 
considered by an independent administrator to be essential to video 
compression technology.343  The pooling agreement stated that only 
essential patents would be included and five-year package licenses for all 
of the patents in the pool would be provided for set royalties.344  In 
approving the arrangement, the DOJ laid forth the following guidelines 
for when a patent pool would probably be approved:  (1) the pooled 
patents must be valid and not expired;345 (2) the pool should not aggregate 
competitive technologies and set a single price for them; (3) the 
determination of whether a patent is essential to complement 
technologies in the pool should be made by an independent expert, 346 and 
(4) the pool agreement must not disadvantage competitors or facilitate 
collusion in downstream product markets.347 
Although the MPEG-2 letter has clear efficiency justifications, the DOJ’s 
decision has also been criticized.  According to one observer, “the 
anticompetitive potential of the MPEG LA patent pool is enormous. The 
DOJ's approval of the pool validates a collectively enforced monopoly 
over a fundamental communications standard.”348 
In the first DVD Business Review Letter, the Justice Department 
narrowed the scope of their inquiry from five points down to two 
fundamental questions: (1) "whether the proposed licensing program is 
likely to integrate complementary patent rights," and (2) "if so, whether 
                                                 
343  MPEG-2 Business Review Letter, supra. 
344  Id. 
345  "A licensing scheme premised on invalid or expired intellectual property rights will not 
withstand antitrust scrutiny."  MPEG-2 Business Review Letter, supra n. 330 (referring to 
United States v. Pilkington plc, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,842 (D. Ariz. 1994)(consent 
decree resolving antitrust suit against exclusive licenses premised on technology covered by 
expired patents).   
346  The Justice Department stated that: “[t]he continuing role of an independent expert to assess 
essentiality is an especially effective guarantor that the Portfolio patents are complements, 
not substitutes.”  MPEG-2 Business Review Letter, supra n. 330. The existence of certain 
structural safeguards is necessary to ensure the expert retains his or her independence.  It is 
important that the expert’s determinations are conclusive and non-appealable, that the expert 
can only be dismissed for malfeasance or nonfeasance and that the expert’s compensation is 
not affected by his or her determinations of essentiality. 
347  Id.   
348  Carlson, supra, at 372. 
Intellectual Property and Antitrust                              471 
Volume 43 — Number 4 
the resulting competitive benefits are likely to be outweighed by 
competitive harm posed by other aspects of the program."349  
This same two-step analysis was applied more recently in the DOJ´s 
approval of the 3G patent platform.350  3G refers to the third generation of 
wireless communication systems, which is based on five different radio 
interface technologies.351  Unlike a conventional patent pool, the patent 
platform included patents related to each of the five separate 3G 
standards and was composed of several distinct entities.352  This was 
meant to ensure that if the platform´s actions implicated competitive 
considerations among the five technologies, competitive choices would 
be made independently for each technology.353  The DOJ´s approval noted 
that the platform was likely to facilitate the availability of 
complementary patent rights related to each of the five standards, and 
could lower search and transaction costs for manufacturers and service 
providers who needed access to these patent rights.354 
VISX 
In the VISX case,355 the FTC challenged a patent pool involving VISX and 
Summit Technology, the only two companies in the United States with 
patents relating to the commercial use of photoreactive keratectomy 
(PRK), a form of laser eye surgery.  According to the FTC’s complaint, 
the two companies had pooled their patents and agreed to establish fixed 
fees for licensing.356  The two firms then shared the licensing fees 
according to a predetermined formula.  Without the patent pool, the FTC 
claimed that the two companies would have competed in the sale or lease 
of PRK equipment and in the licensing of PRK technology.357  However, 
                                                 
349  DVD Business Review Letter #1, supra. 
350   Letter from Charles A. James to Ky P. Ewing, Esq., 3G Business Review Letter (November 





355  In re Summit Technology, Inc., & VISX, Inc., 1999 FTC LEXIS 113 (1999) (decision as 
relates to complaint against VISX); In reSummit Technology, Inc., & VISX, Inc., 1999 FTC 
LEXIS 23 (1999) (decision as relates to complaint against Summit Technology). 
356  See In the Matter of Summit Technology, Inc., and VISX, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9286 
(complaint) (1998).   
357  Id. 
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the companies argued that the patents in their pool were “blocking,” and 
not potential competitors.  The FTC entered a consent decree prohibiting 
the defendants from engaging in retail price maintenance, and required 
the firms to license their patents to one another on a royalty-free, non-
exclusive basis because investments subsequent to the pool made cross-
licensing desirable.   
 
 
IX.  STANDARD SETTING 
Industry standards are extremely common, especially in high technology 
areas such as information technology that are heavily dependent on 
innovation and intellectual property rights.358  Standard setting can 
promote innovation and economic efficiency by providing an agreed-
upon base or by ensuring product quality.359  Standards can also improve 
price competition, because standardized products and technologies can be 
more easily compared and contrasted.360  However, standard setting can 
also be misused to block rivals’ innovation or increase costs by excluding 
new products or services.361   
Standard setting issues often overlap with patent-pool issues, as it is 
common for a patent pool to include the necessary technology to comply 
with a particular industry standard.  However, standard setting also raises 
its own antitrust issues.  Where the standards relate to intellectual 
property, these issues can become quite complicated, and have received 
relatively little attention in the Licensing Guidelines.362 
                                                 
358  The rise of standards has been credited to three main driving forces: product interoperability; 
public health and safety; and global competitiveness.  See Janice M. Mueller, Patenting 
Industry Standards, 34 John Marshall L. Rev. 897, 903 (2001); See generally David A. 
Balto, Standard Setting in the 21st Century Network Economy, 18, No. 6 The Computer & 
Internet Law., 5  (June 2001).  
359  See Ernest Gellhorn, Speech, Standard Setting FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and 
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy,  (FTC/DOJ, Apr. 
18, 2002) (available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/>) (accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
360  See Balto, supra. 
361  Id. See FTC Staff Report, Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New 
High-Tech, Global Marketplace, (May 1996) (available in 1996 WL 293773). 
362  The Licensing Guidelines address cross-licensing and patent pooling but may not give 
sufficient guidance on the more elaborate issues raised by standard-setting organizations.  
Richard C. Levin, Presentation, FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property 
Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, FTC/DOJ Joint Hearings on 
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The problem of anticompetitive standards can be analyzed similarly to 
any other Section 1 conspiracy in restraint of trade.  The rule of reason 
will generally apply.363  Standards can be considered anticompetitive 
when they illegitimately raise prices, restrict competition, facilitate 
collusion,  and, in rare cases, when they deny membership to a 
competitor.364  It is important to note that the rule of reason approach only 
applies to adoption of standards by private industry. When private groups 
devise standards and then petition the government for their adoption by 
public sector bodies, their petitions could be protected from antitrust 
liability under the Noerr doctrine.365  
Possibly in reaction to the current state of legal uncertainty, standard-
setting bodies have implemented a wide variety of policies with regards 
to intellectual policy rights.366  Some “require that the owner of any patent 
deemed essential to practicing the standard grant a royalty-free license to 
any user of the standard.”367  Others “require that patent owners grant 
licenses under terms that are ‘reasonable and non-discriminatory.’”368  
Finally, there are some standard-setting bodies that do not oblige patent 
owners to license at all.369   
 The FTC is reported to be conducting a number of investigations 
into disputes concerning the non-disclosure of patents or patent 
applications to industry standard-setting groups.  This problem was also 
explored during the recent FTC/DOJ hearings on intellectual property 
                                                                                                                       
Competition and Intellectual Property Law (FTC/DOJ, Feb. 6, 2002) (available at < 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/>) (accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
363  See Natl. Assn. of Rev. Appraisers & Mortg. Underwriters, Inc. v. The Appraisal Found., 64 
F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (8th Cir. 1995); Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 
F.2d 284, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1988). 
364  Balto, supra, at 7.  The denial of membership in a standard-setting organization has been 
analyzed under essential facilities doctrine and group boycott doctrine. See Hovenkamp, 
supra, at § 35.3. 
365  See Gellhorn, supra (discussing Noerr-Pennington doctrine that lobbying activities are 
exempted from antitrust scrutiny). 
366   See Mueller, supra, at 906-07. 
367     Id. at 906. 
368     Id. 
369     Id. at 906-07. 
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and antitrust.370  The leading case involving this issue is In re Dell 
Computer Corporation.371 
1. Dell Computer 
In 1996, the FTC alleged that the failure of computer manufacturer Dell 
to disclose certain of its patents to an industry standard-setting 
organization violated the antitrust laws.372  Dell representatives were part 
of the Video Electronics Standards Association, a non-profit industry 
association that was in the process of developing a standard for the VL-
bus, an important computer part.373  The association included virtually all 
major U.S. computer hardware and software manufacturers.374  The 
association required disclosure of intellectual property rights.375  Dell 
participated, but failed to disclose its relevant patents.376  Once the 
standard had been adopted, Dell revealed that compliance would violate 
its patents.377  The FTC brought an enforcement action, alleging that 
Dell’s “bait and switch” tactics threatened to retard the development and 
adoption of VL-bus standards and discourage future standard-setting 
efforts.378  The case was eventually settled, with Dell agreeing not to 
enforce its patents that covered the VL-bus standard.379   
The settlement has been criticized for a number of reasons.  For one 
thing, it is not seen as providing sufficient guidance for other standard-
setting organizations, especially on the issue of intent.380  The FTC 
majority stated that the non-disclosure by the Dell representative was 
“not inadvertent.”381 Although “not inadvertent” may have been an 
                                                 
370   David A. Balto & Daniel I. Prywes, Standard-Setting Disputes: The Need for FTC 
Guidelines, FTC Watch (March 25, 2002).   
371  121 F.T.C. 616, 619 (Fed. Trade Commn. 1996). 
372    Id. at 618.   
373    Id. at 617. 
374    Id.  
375    Id. 
376    Id. at 617.   
377    Dell Computer, 121 F.T.C. at 617.  
378 Id. at 619-20.     
379    Id. at 619-20.   
380  Balto & Prywes, supra. 
381  Dell Computer, 121 F.T.C.  at 625-26. 
Intellectual Property and Antitrust                              475 
Volume 43 — Number 4 
appropriate statement for the level of evidence secured, it did not provide 
much guidance to standard-setting participants about the scope of their 
duty (if any) to search for intellectual property rights or to disclose those 
rights.382  Moreover, the Dell enforcement action did not suggest what 
kind of disclosure duty a standard-setting body should impose upon its 
members.383 
2. FTC v. Rambus384 
 The FTC’s Rambus complaint is a more recent response to a 
situation analogous to the situation in Dell Computer.  The FTC filed a 
complaint alleging that Rambus violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by 
engaging in unfair competition, monopolization, and attempted 
monopolization of certain markets relating to technological features 
necessary for the design and manufacture of a common form of digital 
computer memory, known as dynamic random access memory 
(DRAM).385  The FTC claimed that Rambus failed to disclose its 
ownership of certain relevant patents and patent applications to an 
industry standard-setting organization of which it was a member 
(JEDEC),386 in violation of the organization’s rules.    
A Rambus representative allegedly attended numerous JEDEC meetings 
at which standards were discussed that clearly would implicate current 
and pending Rambus patents.387  However, the company purposefully 
concealed the existence of these patents and patent applications from the 
other members of the group.388  According to the FTC complaint:  
“Rambus never disclosed to JEDEC the fact that, throughout the duration 
of its membership in the organization, Rambus had on file with the PTO, 
and was actively prosecuting, patent applications that, in its view, either 
                                                 
382    Balto & Prywes, supra.  
383    Id.   
384   In re Rambus, Inc., 2002 FTC LEXIS 31 (F.T.C. Dkt. No. 9302) (complaint) (June 18, 
2002). 
385  Id. at *23-*32. 
386  JEDEC is short for the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association (originally known as the 
Joint Electron Device Engineering Council).  The organization’s primary purpose is to 
“promote the development and standardization of terms, definitions, product 
characterization, test methods, manufacturing support functions and mechanical standards 
for solid state products.”  Id. at *7. 
387  Id. at *5.  
388  Id. at *2. 
476                         IDEA –The Journal of Law and Technology 
43 IDEA 413 (2003) 
covered or could easily be amended to cover elements of the existing and 
future SDRAM standards.”389 
The complaint further alleged that in 1999, after JEDEC-compliant 
DRAM had largely replaced the older technology, Rambus entered into 
licenses with seven major DRAM manufacturers and initiated patent 
infringement lawsuits against others (one of which led to an additional 
license).390  In recompense for these licenses, Rambus would have 
collected royalties in the range of $50-$100 million per year, and if it 
succeeded in its patent suits, that number could increase to well over $1 
billion per year.391 
 The relief contemplated by the FTC includes that Rambus cease 
and desist from undertaking infringement litigation for the relevant 
DRAM patents, and employ an FTC-approved compliance officer “for 
the purpose of communicating [Rambus’s] patent rights related to any 
standard under consideration by any standard-setting organization of 
which [Rambus] is a member.”392 
3. Rambus v. Infineon393 
 Many of the issues brought up in the FTC’s Rambus complaint 
also arose in private litigation between Rambus and Infineon.  Rambus 
brought suit against Infineon for patent infringement on certain DRAM-
related technology, but the suit was thrown out as a matter of law.394  
Infineon filed a number of counterclaims, including accusing Rambus of 
fraud for failing to disclose the existence of its DRAM patents to 
JEDEC.395  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Rambus liable for 
committing fraud in its conduct at JEDEC, and the court upheld this 
result.396   
 
After the trial the district court granted JMOL on the DDR-SDRAM fraud 
verdict and denied another JMOL on the SDRAM fraud verdict.  Both parties 
                                                 
389  Id. at *32. 
390  Rambus, 2002 FTC LEXIS at *56-*57. 
391  Id. at *57. 
392  Id. at *78. 
393  Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs., 155 F. Supp. 2d 668 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
394  Id. at 670. 
395    Id. at 671.   
396  Id. at 670-71. 
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appealed.  On January 29, 2003, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
the district courts ruling which had allowed the SDRAM fraud claim to stand.  
In Virginia a claim of fraud prevails when all of the following elements are met 
with clear and convincing evidence: 1) a false representation (or omission in the 
face of a duty to disclose), 2) of a material fact, 3) made intentionally and 
knowingly, 4) with the intent to misled 5) with reasonable reliance by the 
misled party, and 6) resulting in damages to the misled party.397  The court 
focused on the first element.   
In deciding whether Rambus owed a duty to disclose, the court examined 
JEDEC patent policy requiring members to disclose related patents during the 
development of a new standard.  The court stated that JEDEC’s policy was 
vague.398  During a meeting in October 1993, JEDEC used viewgraphs on a 
screen to show the “patent policy.”399  The language on the screen did not 
impose any direct duty on its members it only required the chairman to point 
members to the duty.400  Moreover, there was no evidence that members ever 
legally agreed to the disclosure duty.401 Members did not know when the duty 
would be imposed which could be as soon as a new standard was discussed or 
once standardization formally began.402 “A policy that does not define clearly 
what, when, how, and to whom the members must disclose does not provide a 
firm basis from the disclosure duty necessary for a fraud verdict.”403  
The court found that the duty to disclose  “extends only to claims in patents or 
applications that reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard.”404  
Because Rambus had other patent applications that could not be reasonably 
needed to practice the SDRAM standard, the court held that Rambus did not 
breach a duty to disclose. “Rambus’ mistaken belief that it had pending claims 
covering the standard does not substitute for the proof required…” to show 
Rambus had a duty to disclose.405 
                                                 
397 2003 WL 187265 (Fed. Cir. (Va.)).  p. 11. 
398  Id. at 19. 
399 Id. at 14. 
400 Id. at 13. 
401 Id. at 13. 
402 Id. at 17. 
403 Id. at 17. 
404 Id. at 16. 
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Following this case, the law concerning standard setting appears to be in 
a state of flux.  The Federal Circuit´s decision is in conflict with the 
FTC´s earlier decision to prosecute in FTC v. Rambus.406 
X.  ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Normally, the enforcement of intellectual property rights will not lead to 
an antitrust violation.  However, there are certain exceptions to this rule, 
most notably the Walker Process doctrine. 
A. Walker Process Doctrine 
According to the Supreme Court’s holding in Walker Process Equipment, 
Incorporated v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corporation,407 when a 
company obtains a patent by committing fraud on the PTO408 and then 
attempts to enforce that patent on its competitor, its actions can constitute 
purposeful anticompetitive conduct, and therefore lead to a Sherman Act 
Section 2 violation.409  This holding has since been expanded upon in a 
number of important circuit court cases.410 
Walker Process doctrine holds that a finding of fraud requires clear and 
convincing proof of the misrepresentation or omission of a material fact 
with the intent to deceive the patent examiner.411  This must result in the 
issuance of a patent that would not have been granted absent the 
fraudulent conduct.412  The other required elements for a Section 2 offense 
must also be present.  These other elements include proof of power in the 
                                                 
406 Supra. 
407  382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
408  The fraudulent procurement of a patent can also violate Section 5 of the FTC Act.  American 
Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 771 (6th Cir. 1966). 
409    Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174.  
410  See e.g. Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chemical Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 771-73 (9th Cir. 
1971); Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1972); Litton 
Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 166 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
411  Oetiker v. Jurid Werke GMBH, 671 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  The fraud may consist 
of either a misstatement or an omission of pertinent information. See Rohm, 456 F.2d at 599-
600; Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 129 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997), rev’d, 
141 F.3d 1059, 1068-70 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Initially holding that Walker Process required 
affirmative misrepresentation, not mere omissions, the same panel four months later 
reversed, accepting the viability of antitrust claims premised on fraudulent omissions.). 
412  Litton, 755 F.2d at 166; Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d. at 1071. 
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relevant market413 and injury as a proximate result of the enforcement 
actions.414 
Walker Process claims generally arise as counterclaims in patent 
infringement litigation.415  In these circumstances, the claims will go on 
appeal to the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
over district court claims involving the patent laws “in whole or in 
part.”416  A Section 2 violation can also result where the patent was not 
secured by fraud but the patentee came to know that the patent was 
invalid and nevertheless pursued the infringement action.417   
B. Sham Litigation 
Sham litigation to enforce intellectual property rights can violate Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, or Section 1 of the Sherman Act if the litigation 
involves collective action.  In Professional Real Estate Investors v. 
Columbia Pictures Industries418 (PRE), the Supreme Court introduced a 
two-part test for when a suit loses antitrust immunity419 and can be termed 
a "sham":  
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.  If an objective 
litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a 
favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an antitrust claim 
premised on the sham exception must fail.  Only if challenged litigation is 
objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant's subjective motivation.  
Under this second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus on 
whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an attempt to interfere directly with 
the business relationships of a competitor," [E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)] (emphasis added), through the 
                                                 
413  See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
414  This means that at a minimum the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to manufacture the 
patented subject matter. See Indium Corp. of America v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 379, 
385 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 781 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
415  See Robert J. Hoerner, Bad Faith Enforcement of Patents – Antitrust Considerations, 55 
Antitrust L.J. 421, 422-23 (1986). 
416  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 
417  See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 994 (9th Cir. 1979); Tennant Co. v. Hako 
Minuteman, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 945, 958-59 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
418  508 U.S. 49, 60-62 (1993). 
419  Normally lawsuits are immune from antitrust challenge as governmental petitions under the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v Pennington, 381 U.S. 
657 (1965). 
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"use [of] the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that 
process—as an anticompetitive weapon," [City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor 
Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991)] (emphasis in original).420   
The objectively baseless standard has been held to apply to the lawsuit as 
a whole, so that a suit will not be held to be a sham if some causes of 
action are baseless and others are well founded.421  Sham litigation suits 
can allege either that the patent holder knew that their relevant patent was 
invalid or that the patent holder knew that the patent, while valid, was not 
being infringed.  Sham litigation counterclaims are often filed in patent 
infringement suits, but are seldom successful.422   
In re Buspirone Patent Litigation423 
 This case involved six antitrust complaints brought by 30 states, 
various generic drug makers and purchasers, and consumer protection 
organizations against Bristol-Myers Squib ("BMS") for unlawfully 
maintaining its monopoly for buspirone hydrochloride-based prescription 
drug products (buspirone).424  Plaintiffs charged BMS with unlawfully 
maintaining its monopoly over buspirone by improperly listing a patent 
in the FDA's Orange Book, and with conspiring to restrain trade in the 
market by settling a patent infringement suit with Danbury Pharmacal, 
Incorporated and its affiliate Schein Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated, in 
violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.425 
 BMS moved to dismiss all of the antitrust claims on both Noerr-
Pennington and patent immunity grounds.426  However, the court denied 
their motions to dismiss.427  In so doing, it decided that the listing of a 
patent in the Orange Book did not constitute “petitioning” activity 
according to Noerr-Pennington doctrine because the government’s role 
                                                 
420  508 U.S. at 60-61 (footnote omitted). 
421  Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 565 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Matsushita Elecs. Corp. v. Loral Corp., 974 F. Supp. 345, 357 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
422  See Holmes, supra, at 38-7 to 38-11. 
423  185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
424  See generally David A. Balto & Jeremy O. Evans, Antitrust and Regulatory Filings: The 
Buspirone Patent Litigation, 4 FDLI Update 37 (July/August 2002). 
425    Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 366.   
426    Id. at 367-69.   
427    Id. at 380.   
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was only ministerial,428 and that the BMS listings in this case were 
fraudulent under Walker Process doctrine.429  The court went on to say 
that the subsequent patent litigation arose from "misrepresentations" in 
the process and was therefore "baseless" and therefore a "sham."430   
 The district court applied the legal framework from PRE for 
defining "sham" litigation.431  In so doing, the court, found that, 
objectively speaking, no reasonable litigant could have expected success 
on the merits of BMS's interpretation of the patent claims.432  The court 
first clarified that the test under PRE is an objective one, depending on 
"whether there are, in fact, sufficient objective bases for the positions 
taken," and not "on the quality of the lawyering."433  Here, "[t]he language 
of the [patent] claim, its specification and the prosecution history" 
showed that the patent did not apply, and "[m]oreover, a straightforward 
application of governing patent law provisions establishes that the . . . 
[p]atent would have been invalid if it did."434 
 The court emphasized that this is "not a case in which there are 
occasional places in which [BMS] has mischaracterized or mistaken the 
relevant issues or legal standards.  It is a case where [BMS] has 
repeatedly argued for a position that requires establishing a number of 
claims, each of which has no basis . . . ."435  The district court also found 
that "[t]his is not a case in which [BMS] has been arguing for reasonable 
extensions or developments of the law."436  Thus, the court concluded that 
BMS's conduct was “objectively baseless.”437  
 The Buspirone decision seems to break new ground in important 
areas.438  The treatment of BMS’s conduct under the sham litigation 
standard makes it clear that apparently inconsistent positions taken by a 
                                                 
428  Id. at 369-73. 
429  Id. at 373-75. 
430  Id. at 375-76. 
431    Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
432    Id. at 376.  
433  Id. at 375. 
434  Id. at 376. 
435  Id. (citing Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) for the 
proposition that "objective baselessness can be established by a 'pattern of baseless, 
repetitive claims'."). 
436  Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
437  Id. 
438  See Balto & Evans, supra, at 38. 
482                         IDEA –The Journal of Law and Technology 
43 IDEA 413 (2003) 
patent holder may serve as a foundation for a court to find an objectively 
baseless claim.  It is also one of very few decisions to suggest that a 
submission to the government is not petitioning, and therefore not 
immune under Noerr-Pennington doctrine.  Moreover, it is the first 
decision to apply the Walker Process doctrine outside the context of a 
filing with the Patent Office.   
 
In re Bristol-Myers Squibb 
 
On April 18, 2003, the FTC approved the issuance of a final consent 
order in its case against Bristol-Myers Squibb.439  The FTC´s complaint 
in this matter related to the same facts as gave rise to the In re Buspirone 
litigation described above, as well as similar allegations regarding two of 
BMS´s other drugs: Taxol and Platinol (both of which are anti-cancer 
agents).440   
The FTC´s complaint alleged that BMS improperly listed patents for all 
three drugs in the Orange Book in order to obtain unwarranted 30-month 
stays on FDA approval of generic competitors.441  The complaint stated 
that BMS violated the anti-monopolization provision of Section 5 of the 
FTC Act442 by intentionally misleading the FDA about the scope, 
validity, and enforceability of these patents.443  For example, BMS 
declared that its ‘365 patent covered a “method of using BuSpar for all 
of its approved indications”, although they knew that it only really 
covered a method of using a metabolite, as opposed to buspirone itself.444  
This was significant because only patent claims for BuSpar or methods 
of use for BuSpar could at that point properly be listed in the Orange 
Book.445 
                                                 
439 See In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb, FTC Docket No. C-4076 (decision and order) 
(2003) http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbdo.pdf. 
440 See In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb, FTC Docket No. C-4076 (complaint) (2003) 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf. 
441 Id. 
442 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
443 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb (complaint, supra) at 24-26. 
444 Id. at 9. 
445 Id. at 10.  See listing requirements at 21 U.S.C.§§ 355 (c)(1) and (c)(2). 
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The FTC concluded that Noerr-Pennington immunity did not apply to 
Orange Book listings because they do not constitute petitioning 
behavior.446  The FTC also asserted that BMS´s filings would fall outside 
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because they involved knowing and 
material misrepresentations.447   
The complaint alleged two other actions that were taken by BMS in 
concert with other firms.448  According to the complaint, BMS agreed 
with Schein to settle patent litigation by paying Schein not to compete 
until the patent expired, and agreed with ABI to wrongfully list ABI's 
'331 patent.449  These acts were alleged to unreasonably restrain trade in 
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.450 
 The final consent order eliminated BMS´s ability to obtain a 30-
month stay on later-listed patents.451 The order also barred a 30-month 
stay, regardless of when the patent was listed, in cases where Bristol had 
engaged in misconduct in connection with obtaining and listing the 
patent.452  Relevant misconduct included inequitable actions before the 
PTO in obtaining the patent, making false or misleading statements to the 
FDA in connection with listing the patent, and providing patent 
information to the FDA that was inconsistent with information provided 
to the PTO.453 
C. Infringement Suits as Part of Scheme to Monopolize 
There is also the possibility that a patent holder may incur antitrust 
liability when bringing a patent infringement suit even absent bad faith 
                                                 
446 Id at 24. 
447 Id. 
448 Id. at 5-7, 18-20. 
449 Id. 
450 Id at 24, 26. 
451 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb (decision and order, supra) at 6.  Later-listed patents are 
those listed by a brand-name manufacturer in the Orange Book after a generic manufacturer 
has sought FDA approval for a competing generic version.  According to an FTC report, 
later-listed patents lead to substantial delay of FDA approval, often enabling the brand-name 
manufacturer to obtain multiple 30-month stays.  Later-listed patents also frequently present 
significant questions as to whether they meet the statutory listing criteria. See Generic Drug 
Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study 39-56 (July 2002), (available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf). 
452 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb (decision and order, supra) at 6-7.   
453 Id. 
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where the suit is part of a larger monopolization scheme that would 
violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.454  Thus, in Kobe, Incorporated v. 
Dempsey Pump Corporation, the court found a monopolization scheme 
by looking at the company’s infringement suits in combination with their 
acquisitions of all patents relevant to the industry, the signing of 
covenants not to compete, and threatened suits against companies trading 
with the alleged patent infringers.455  The court noted that the 
infringement suits themselves would not have been unlawful in isolation 
from the other activities.456 
D. Intellectual Property Misuse 
The courts have found certain commercial actions by intellectual 
property owners that do not violate the antitrust laws to be improper and 
constitute intellectual property misuse.  The misuse concept apparently 
originated in the patent area and is intended to prevent the patentee from 
extending the power of the patent beyond the grant defined in the patent 
claims.457   
Misuse is not a basis for an affirmative damages suit, but rather 
constitutes a defense in a suit for infringement.458  The misuse doctrine is 
equitable in nature and arises out of the defense of “unclean hands.”459  A 
misuse defense does not render a patent invalid but instead renders the 
patent unenforceable until the patent owner purges him or herself of the 
misuse.460 
Some commentators believe that the intellectual property misuse doctrine 
is unnecessary.  Because the antitrust laws are intended to separate 
procompetitive from anticompetitive conduct, it is not clear what rational 
                                                 
454  See Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 422-24 (10th Cir. 1952); Dairy Foods, 
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457  See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The key inquiry 
is whether, by imposing conditions that derive their force from the patent, the patentee has 
impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.”). 
458     See Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed.Cir.1986)); Virginia Panel 
Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868-669 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
459  C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1372; Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 
(1942). 
460    C. R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1372. 
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economic policy is furthered by using the antitrust misuse doctrine to 
punish conduct when there is no violation of the antitrust laws.461  
XI.  PATENT SETTLEMENTS 
Settlements of patent infringement litigation often bring up difficult 
antitrust issues.  Patent infringement settlements sometimes include 
terms involving cross-licensing, pooling arrangements, agreements not to 
infringe, agreements not to compete in some way, market divisions and 
other clauses that can be considered anticompetitive.  Each of these terms 
must be analyzed under appropriate antitrust principles.  The Patent Act462 
mandates that the Patent and Trademark Office be notified of all 
settlements of patent infringement suits , in order to assess whether the 
conflicting patent rights are being legitimately resolved.463  
According to the Licensing Guidelines, "Settlements involving the cross-
licensing of intellectual property rights can be an efficient means to avoid 
litigation and, in general, courts favor such settlements."464  However, the 
Guidelines advise that, "[w]hen such [settlement] involves horizontal 
competitors, however, the [government] will consider whether the effect 
of the settlement is to diminish competition among entities that would 
have been actual or likely potential competitors" in the absence of the 
settlement.465  
Even setting aside the efficiency justification that settlements are vital to 
avoid costly and time-consuming litigation, most “patent settlements 
probably are procompetitive or competitively neutral.”466  “Patent 
                                                 
461  See Roger B. Andewelt, Competition Policy and the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 25 Pat. 
Trademark & Copy. J. 41, 42 (1982). 
462  35 U.S.C. § 135(c). 
463  See ABA, Antitrust Section, 2 Antitrust Law Developments vol. 2, 1085 (Debra J. Pearlstein 
5th ed. ABA 2002).  Former Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein has suggested a similar 
notification system for the antitrust agencies.  Joel Klein, Speech, Cross-Licensing and 
Antitrust Law (Am. Intell. Prop. L. Assn., May 2, 1997) (available at 
<www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm>) (accessed Mar. 7, 2003).  
464  Licensing Guidelines, supra § 5.5. 
465  Id. 
466  See generally David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 
Food & Drug L.J. 321, 327-28 (2000).  See Klein, supra, at 3, stating:   
 [B]y far most cross-licenses and [patent] pools are, on balance, 
procompetitive. That means that, at bottom, they help sellers provide 
consumers with better products and services at lower prices because of 
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settlements are procompetitive where firms combine their intellectual 
property to produce a product that otherwise would not exist, or where a 
patent holder and a new entrant compromise their dispute to allow the 
new entrant to come to market for compensation paid to the patent 
holder.”467  The latter type of settlement removes uncertainty for the 
parties surrounding the patent at issue, eliminates a barrier to one firm 
entering the market, and generally allows both parties to compete in the 
marketplace, albeit with one party typically paying royalties to the 
other.468  These arrangements are not free of competitive concerns, but 
offer the promise of some additional competition in the market. 
The leading case finding an anticompetitive settlement of a patent dispute 
is the 1963 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Singer 
Manufacturing Company.469  In that case, the Court found that the salient 
purpose of cross-licensing agreements entered into by producers of 
sewing machines, in which they agreed not to sue each other for 
infringement, was not to settle disputes among the parties but rather to 
exclude competition from Japanese manufacturers in violation of the 
antitrust laws.470  As the Singer holding was characterized in the 1976 
Fifth Circuit opinion, Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken, 
Incorporated471, the crucial finding in settlement challenges is "not the 
mere act of settlement but the intent of the parties in entering into that 
settlement and their actions pursuant thereto."472 
There are a number of potential competitive concerns from these types of 
settlements.  For one thing, as Justice White suggests, there is a public 
interest in the determination of whether the patent really is valid.473  As he 
noted in United States v. Glaxo Group Limited,474 "[i]t is as important to 
the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, 
as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in 
                                                                                                                       
benefits ranging from cost savings--due to more efficient production 
technologies--to improved product quality--resulting from combining 
complementary inventions.   
467    Licensing Guidelines, supra, § 5.5; Balto, 55 Food & Drug L.J. at 328.   
468  Id.  
469  374 U.S. 174, 195-96 (1963). 
470  Id. at 192-93. 
471    540 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1976). 
472  Id. at 1221. 
473    United States v. Glaxo Group Limited, 410 U.S. 52 (1973).   
474    Id.   
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his monopoly."475 Some patents may be invalid or procured improperly.  
For another, the terms of the settlement may actually delay or prevent the 
entry of a competing product, or divide a market between competitors.476  
In addition, as in Singer, the settling challenger may have important 
evidence about the validity of the patent that may be lost in the 
settlement.  So ultimately, a settlement may serve the interests of the 
parties at the expense of consumers and competitors.  As Assistant 
Attorney General Joel Klein has observed:  
[S]ettlements are often based on considerations that lead parties to give up 
rights that they might well vindicate if they went to the mat.  And when 
intellectual property rights are at stake, the consequences of those 
compromises can align the settlers' interests against the interests of 
consumers.477 
Some courts have asserted that patent litigation settlements are protected 
from antitrust scrutiny under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.478  However, 
other cases have held that interim settlements between private parties 
may be subject to antitrust challenge.479 
Recently, there has been considerable FTC interest in settlements that are 
alleged to involve a patent owner paying an alleged infringer in return for 
an agreement by the infringer not to compete in a particular market.480  
Three actions have been brought in the pharmaceutical industry in 
relation to settlements between producers of generic and branded drugs.481  
                                                 
475  Id. at 58 (quoting Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)). 
476  See Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Intl., 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(provisions in the settlement “were not necessarily ancillary restraints but rather could 
reasonably be viewed as an attempt to allocate market share and preserve monopolistic 
conditions.”). 
477  Klein, supra, at 4. 
478  See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof. Real Est. Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1528 
(9th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (“[a] decision to accept or reject an offer of 
settlement is conduct incidental to the prosecution of the suit” and therefore immunized from 
antitrust liability).   
479  See Andrx Pharmaceuticals, 256 F.3d at 817-19; In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. 
Supp. 2d 618, 633 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that an interim settlement between private 
parties can be subject to antitrust challenge). 
480  See Chairman Timothy J. Muris, Prepared Statement, Prepared Statement of The Federal 
Trade Commission Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
United States Senate (Washington, D.C., Apr. 23, 2002), (available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm>) (accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
481  See In re Abbott Laboratories., 2000 FTC LEXIS 65 (F.T.C. Dkt. Nos., C-3945, C-3946) 
(complaint) (May 22, 2000); In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 2000 FTC Lexis 16 (F.T.C. 
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These settlements are covered by the regulatory structure of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.482  There is currently disagreement regarding the issue of 
whether possibly offensive terms in these settlements should be 
considered per se illegal or should be analyzed under the rule of reason.483 
Ultimately, these issues involve difficult choices and the balancing of 
conflicting interests.  According to FTC Commissioner Leary: 
These settlements, like any patent settlement, require a resolution of two 
conflicting policies.  On the one hand, there is a policy in favor of resolving 
disputes in order to conserve public and private resources and, in some cases, 
to facilitate entry.  On the other hand, there is always a risk of a collusive 
agreement to share monopoly profits from an invalid patent.484  
XII.  PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
A. Federal Circuit Jurisdiction 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was created by Congress in 1982 to 
centralize patent appeals.485  The Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statutes, 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a) and 1338(a), give it exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
in appeals from the PTO with respect to patent applications, and in civil 
action appeals where district court jurisdiction originally arose under the 
patent laws, either “in whole or in part.”486  Federal Circuit jurisdiction is 
also available where “the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on 
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.”487  It is 
                                                                                                                       
Dkt. No. C-9293) (complaint) (Mar. 16, 2000); In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2001 FTC 
Lexis 39 (F.T.C. Dkt. No. C-9297) (complaint) (Mar. 30, 2001). 
482  21 U.S.C. § 335 (1999). 
483  See ABA, Antitrust Section, 2 Antitrust Law Developments vol. 2 1087 (Debra J. Pearlstein 
5th ed. ABA 2002); compare Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 676-79 (finding that certain 
aspects of a settlement between branded and generic drug manufacturers constituted per se 
illegal horizontal market allocation) with Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., 37 F. Supp. 2d 
85, 93 (D. Mass. 1999) (settlement during pendency of appeal did not extend the physical or 
temporal scope of patent and was not patent misuse). 
484  Commissioner Thomas Leary, Prepared Remarks, Antitrust Issues in Settlement of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes (Chicago, Ill., Nov. 3, 2000) (available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharma.htm>) (accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
485  See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989). 
486  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).  
487  Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988). 
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important to emphasize that the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction does not 
encompass claims arising under the trademark, copyright, or trade secret 
laws.  
This jurisdictional requirement had until recently been given a fairly 
broad interpretation by the courts.  For example, both the First Circuit 
and the Federal Circuit have held that the presence of a non-frivolous 
compulsory counterclaim for patent infringement will give the Federal 
Circuit exclusive jurisdiction.488  The Federal Circuit later expanded this 
holding to include permissive counterclaims.489  However, in the recent 
Supreme Court case of Holmes Group, Incorporated v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Systems, Incorporated,490 the Court held that the Federal 
Circuit cannot assert jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint does 
not allege a patent-law claim, but the answer contains a patent-law 
counterclaim.491  There, the Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) as 
providing Federal Circuit jurisdiction only where the jurisdictional 
requirements (that the case either arise under the patent laws or depend 
on the resolution of a substantial question of patent law) appear on the 
plaintiff’s “well pleaded complaint.”492  The Court did not address the 
issue of whether actual or constructive amendments to an already filed 
complaint can create Federal Circuit jurisdiction.493  
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction has been found to encompass state law 
actions containing a falsity element where the plaintiff is required to 
prove patent infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability as part of the 
claim.494 
Even when the antitrust and patent claims have been severed in the 
district court proceedings according to Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the antitrust claims will generally go to the Federal 
                                                 
488  Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736, 739-45 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en 
banc); Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 825 F.2d 604, 607-08 (1st Cir. 1987). 
489  DSC Communs. Corp. v. Pulse Communs., Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).   
490  122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002). 
491  Id. at 1894. 
492  Id. at 1893. 
493  Id. at 1893 n. 1. 
494  See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1331-36 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), rev’d in part on other grounds, Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 
F.3d 1356, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 1999); U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
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Circuit on appeal.495  However, when all the patent claims in the 
proceedings have been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice at the 
district court level, the Federal Circuit will not have jurisdiction over an 
appeal of the remaining issues.496 
Some commentators have concluded that the Federal Circuit has been 
overly protective of intellectual property at the expense of competition 
concerns.497  However, others view it as a success because it has 
diminished the uncertainty that used to govern patent law.498 
B. Choice of Law 
In the years since its inception, the Federal Circuit has developed its own 
case law with respect to the interpretation of patent law.  However, 
before 1998, it applied the law of the originating jurisdiction with respect 
to non-patent law questions, including antitrust issues.  This distinction 
has been significantly eroded in the last few years, starting with the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Pro-Mold & Tool Company v. Great Lakes 
Plastics, Incorporated,499 which held that Federal Circuit law determined 
that inequitable conduct in the prosecution of a patent application did not 
constitute a claim under the Lanham Act.500  
                                                 
495  ABA, Antitrust Section, 2 Antitrust Law Developments, vol. 2, 1109 (Debra J. Pearlstein 5th 
ed. ABA 2002); see Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1574 
(Fed. Cir. 1987). 
496  ABA, Antitrust Section, 2 Antitrust Law Developments, vol. 2, 1109 (Debra J. Pearlstein 5th 
ed. ABA 2002); see Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 
Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 785 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
497  See Richard J. Gray & David Banie, Case Note: Intergraph Corporation v. Intel 
Corporation, 16 Computer & High Tech. L.J. 437, 447 (2000) (suggesting that the Federal 
Circuit's decision in Intergraph shows its support for the proposition that the exercise of 
intellectual property rights will rarely lead to antitrust liability).  
498  See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Statement at FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (FTC/DOJ, Feb. 6, 2002) 
(calling the Federal Circuit an “unqualified success”) (available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect>) (accessed Mar. 7, 2003); James E. Rogan, Prepared 
Remarks at FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in 
the Knowledge-Based Economy (FTC/DOJ, Feb. 6, 2002) (“The existence of a court of 
national jurisdiction for cases involving patents has been an invaluable tool. By reducing the 
jurisdictional conflicts that had preceded the court's formation, the Federal Circuit has made 
for a more stable patent system.”) (available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/>) 
(accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
499  75 F.3d. 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
500    Id. at 1574-75.   
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The current law with respect to antitrust appears to be that “whether 
conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee 
of its immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of 
Federal Circuit law,”501 but regional circuit law applies to other aspects of 
Federal Circuit antitrust claims, such as market definition or proof of 
market power.  It remains for future cases to flesh out the exact 
boundaries of the area where the Federal Circuit should apply its own 
law. 
C. Remedies 
 In Department of Justice actions alleging unlawful provisions in 
copyright and patent licenses, courts have commonly enjoined the 
defendant from enforcing particular provisions of their licensing 
agreement, or from entering into similar agreements in the future.502   
 Compulsory licensing has also been used as a remedy in the past.  
According to the Supreme Court in Glaxo, “[m]andatory selling on 
specified terms and compulsory patent licensing at reasonable charges 
are recognized antitrust remedies.”503 Compulsory licensing has been 
used in particular as a remedy for successful essential facilities claims.504  
However, in recent years both essential facilities claims and compulsory 
licensing have fallen out of favor.505  According to William Kovacic, 
economists have generally found compulsory licensing remedies to be 
ineffective in deconcentrating markets.506  Compulsory licensing remedies 
                                                 
501  Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068. 
502  See ABA, Antitrust Section, 2 Antitrust Law Developments vol. 2, 1112 (Debra J. Pearlstein 
5th ed. ABA 2002). 
503  410 U.S. at 64. 
504  See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185, 194 (D. Mass. 
1991), aff’d, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). 
505  See generally In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 121 S.Ct. 1077 (2001). 
506  See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of 
the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1105, 1106-07 n. 9 (1989) 
("Most commentators have concluded that compulsory licensing decrees generally have 
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Scherer, Innovation and Growth: Schumpeterian Perspectives 207, 220 (MIT Press 1984)).  
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have also been criticized for involving courts in the difficult 
determination of what rate should be charged for the relevant license.507   
XIII.  HEARINGS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
In the spring of 2002, the DOJ and FTC held joint hearings on 
“Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy.”508  The hearings covered a wide range of 
topics including standard setting, patent pools, specific intellectual 
property licensing practices such as grant backs and methods of 
extending the life of intellectual property rights, patent settlements, the 
relationship between competition and intellectual property in other 
jurisdictions, and business experience with patents. 
In announcing the hearings, FTC Chairman Timothy Muris identified a 
number of important trends that the agencies felt merited discussion.509  
Any future policy making in this area is likely to focus, at a minimum, on 
these important areas. 
First, the number of patents has increased substantially in recent years.510  
In 1980, the Patent and Trademark Office issued roughly 66,000 patents, 
whereas, in 2000, over 175,000 patents were issued.511  It has been 
observed that in some industries, the proliferation of patents has lead to 
the creation of a “patent thicket” through which would-be competitors 
must “hack” in order to commercialize a new product.512  This new reality 
raises important questions about how the patent thicket affects barriers to 
entry, and how standard-setting organizations may stifle entry.513  
Additionally, if patent pools and cross-licensing are a way around the 
                                                 
507  See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 56 n. 226 (2001).  
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509  Chairman Timothy Muris, Prepared Remarks Before American Bar Association Antitrust 
Section Fall Forum, Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead 
(Washington, D.C., Nov. 15, 2001) (available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/intellectual.htm>) (last accessed Mar. 7, 2003). 
510    Id.   
511  Id. (citing U.S. Patent and Trademark Office statistics). 
512  Id. (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting, in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds. 2001).  
513    Muris, supra.  
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patent thicket, then the agencies’ analysis of these mechanisms ought to 
be rethought.514   
Second, according to Chairman Muris, the length of the patent grant is 
another issue worthy of reflection.515  Given that utility patents have a 
term of 20 years from the date of the filing of the patent application, one 
can ask whether a patent’s economic life diverges from its legal life.516  
Does it matter if a patent’s legal life is longer than its economic life in 
any event?517  A related issue is whether companies can extend the 
economic significance of a patent beyond its legal life, for example, 
through settlements between manufacturers of patented drugs and 
competing generics.518  
The apparent increase in the scope of patents is another development 
Chairman Muris considers noteworthy.519  For example, the increase in 
the number of business method patents, as well as the expansion of 
patent rights through judicial and legislative interpretation has been a 
contentious development.  One must ask whether this increase in the 
scope of patents has led to increased innovation, or whether it has had the 
opposite effect.520   
In Chairman Muris’ view, a fourth development that merits reflection is 
the role of the Federal Circuit in developing intellectual property 
jurisprudence.521  The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
in matters based “in whole or in part” on patents.522  Where the 
jurisdictional line is drawn can have important implications for forum 
shopping with regards to non-patent issues such as antitrust.523  The 
divergence of the Federal Circuit in areas such as refusals to deal 
underscores the significance of this adjudicative body and its influence 
on antitrust law. 
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This takes us to the final issue that Chairman Muris has identified as of 
particular interest—the recent jurisprudence on refusals to deal.524  As we 
have seen, the Federal Circuit has adopted a position that is much more 
generous to patent holders than the Ninth Circuit.  These decisions raise 
important questions about the intersection of intellectual property and 
antitrust—whether patent holders’ rights should be absolute, or whether 
they should be reinterpreted to reflect competition considerations. 
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